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vAbstract
This thesis presents four experimental studies addressing theories of social interac-
tions and charitable contributions. Social interactions have been identified as an
important nonmarket determinant of economic outcomes. My research provides the-
oretically motivated experimental evidence to advance our understanding of strategic
communication and voluntary contributions.
I consider a model of communication in the presence of investment opportunities
with uncertain returns and positive social externalities. The model predicts that wel-
fare improving communication can only occur when individuals can communicate by
sending a costly signal. I test this model with experiments. While the model predicts
that individuals need to “burn money” in order to effectively communicate, in our
experiments individuals overcommunicate when messages are free and undercommu-
nicate when they are costly. Therefore, we do not see welfare improvements from
costly communication.
In joint work with Jacob Goeree, Leeat Yariv, Tiffany Mitchell, and Tracy Tromp,
we consider the relationship between social closeness and the tendency to be gener-
ous to others in an actual social network. We find that dictator offers are primarily
explained by social distance: giving follows a simple inverse distance law. Our re-
sults suggest that social closeness is a more important predictor of generosity than
individual demographic characteristics.
In another study conducted with Sera Linardi, we adapt Benabou and Tirole’s
(2006) model in order to address the role of honor, stigma and visibility on contri-
vi
butions of time. We consider the effect of excuses and monitoring on the willingness
to volunteer in an experiment combining elements of lab and field. We find that
removing available excuses for not volunteering significantly increases the willingness
to volunteer without negatively affecting productivity.
In further work on charitable giving with Jacob Goeree and Antonio Rangel, we
provide experimental evidence consistent with morally motivated charitable giving.
We find that providing subjects with a suggested contribution amount increases the
willingness to give and that framing the suggestion with moral language further in-
creases contributions. However, moral framing language does not impact the share of
individuals who make no contributions, suggesting that individuals may value contri-
butions above a moral reference point differently from contributions below it.
vii
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Economists have recently begun to consider how social structures and social interac-
tions affect decision-making. The literature points to a variety of ways that individual
behavior might be affected by social interactions. For example, through social interac-
tions, individuals may receive information which has direct impact on their decisions.
An extensive literature has examined the possibility of social learning, where individ-
uals obtain information directly from others, or by observing the decisions of others
(Banerjee and Fudenberg 1994; Ellison and Fudenberg 1993; Callander and Horner
2005; Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer, and Welch 1998).
Another way that individual behavior is affected by social interactions is that
individual appear to have preferences over various dimensions of social interactions.
For example, individuals have preferences related to the well-being of others (Andreoni
and Miller 2002; Charness and Rabin 2002; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and
Ockenfels 2000). Furthermore, theoretical models have proposed that individuals’
utility may also depend on others’ good opinion of them (Benabou and Tirole 2006;
Andreoni and Bernheim 2009). Similarly a natural tendency to compare oneself to
others creates the possibility that individual preferences for conformity stem from a
desire to fit in (Bernheim 1994; Austen Smith and Fryer 2005).
In addition to affecting individuals directly via individual preferences and indi-
rectly via the transmission of information, social interactions also provide opportu-
2nities for strategic communication. Crawford and Sobel (1982) first considered the
possibility that information transmission may not be possible in communication when
individual incentives are not aligned. Understanding when informative communica-
tion is possible is an important component of understanding the role played by social
interactions in economic decision-making.
In chapter 2, I consider theory and experimental evidence on individuals’ willing-
ness to make costly investments to communicate with others when there are strategic
benefits from influencing others’ behavior. I provide a theoretical model which illus-
trates that, in the presence of externalities from individual actions, individuals may
be willing to send costly signals in order to influence others. The predictions of the
model are tested empirically with an experiment comparing outcomes when there is
no communication to two communication institutions: one in which communication
is free and another in which communication is costly. While results from the model
suggest that welfare improvements are possible from communication only when indi-
viduals can communicate at some cost, in our experiments we see the greatest welfare
gains when communication is free. This is because in our experiments individuals
already appear to take actions that benefit their neighbors, softening the strategic
incentives to spend money influencing the actions of others.
Chapter 3 examines how network structure and social closeness affect the will-
ingness to be generous to others. In joint work with Jacob Goeree, Tracy Tromp,
Tiffany Mitchell, and Leeat Yariv, we combine survey data on friendship networks
and individual characteristics with experimental observations from dictator games.
Dictator offers are primarily explained by social distance: giving follows a simple in-
verse distance law. While student demographics play a minor role in explaining offer
amounts, individual heterogeneity is important for network formation. In particular,
we detect significant homophilous behavior: students connect to others similar to
them. Moreover, the network data reveal a strong preference for cliques – students
3are more likely to form connections to those already close.
Chapter 4 contains joint work with Sera Linardi, in which we consider how the
visibility of contributions of time affects the willingness to give. Specifically, we in-
vestigate the effect of excuses and monitoring on voluntary contributions of time and
effort. We extend the theoretical framework proposed by Benabou and Tirole (2006)
to consider the role of honor, stigma and visibility on contributions of time. We design
an experiment that retains the advantages of laboratory control while incorporating
the context of the field by engaging subjects in an actual nonprofit’s operation. We
find that when excuses for deciding not to volunteer are not available, the number
of minutes volunteered increases without affecting the quality of work. Our experi-
mental evidence suggests that social image concerns are complex. While the presence
of a larger audience of peers increases the willingness to volunteer, the presence of
a monitor reduces volunteering. Furthermore, we see evidence of nonlinearities in
stigma over time; subjects avoid being the first to stop volunteering but are more
likely to stop once others have stopped.
Chapter 5 represents joint work with Jacob Goeree and Antonio Rangel provid-
ing experimental evidence that supports a theory of morally-motivated giving. We
test a two-part strategy often used by charities to solicit gifts: a specific suggested
contribution combined with language framed by a sense of moral responsibility. Our
experimental design isolates the effect of the suggested contribution from the addi-
tional impact of framing the suggested contribution in terms of moral responsibility.
We find that providing a suggested contribution significantly increases the average
gift and makes individuals more likely to give at the suggested level. Framing the sug-
gested contribution as a moral responsibility further increases average contributions
and the share of individuals contributing at the suggested level. However, the moral
framing language does not impact the share of individuals who make no contributions
at all, suggesting that individuals may value contributions above a moral reference
4point differently from contributions below a moral reference point.
5Chapter 2
Costly Influence
2.1 Introduction
The role of communication in economic decision making is the subject of recent the-
oretical research. While a growing body of models address the possibility for infor-
mative communication in social interactions when payoffs are interrelated, relatively
few studies consider equilibria in which individuals attempt to strategically influence
the actions of others by “burning money” in order to reveal their own information.
However, in practice we see many examples of individuals investing costly effort to
convince others to take action. Furthermore, individuals appear to be more willing
to make costly investments to convince others when they themselves will benefit from
others’ actions. For example, an individual proposing a risky but mutually beneficial
business plan to a partner might travel a long distance at great cost to have face-to-
face meetings, even though the same information would be exchanged regardless of
where the meeting was conducted. These meetings can be seen as “burning money”
in order for an individual to convince his parter that he has private information about
high returns on investment.
Another example of the potential for communication by “burning money” is efforts
to convince friends to join a social networking service (such as Facebook or MySpace).
Social networking services require costly action and only provide returns when other
6members of one’s social network also participate (which is usually a matter of uncer-
tainty when you make the investment yourself). Therefore, while individuals might
receive a number of invitations to join different social networking services from their
friends, they would be more likely to be influenced to join a service when a friend
has invested significant effort in convincing them (whether by attempting to convince
them by repeatedly discussing the benefits, or taking the time to sit them down to
show them the benefits of the social networking service or enlisting other friends to
attempt to influence them).
In both of these examples, individual communication occurs in the presence of
uncertainty about the returns to investment and complementarities from others’ in-
vestments. These examples suggest that in the presence of both uncertainty and
complementarities, certain kinds of communication can be informative while other
communication may be seen as merely cheap talk. Because of individuals’ private
information, it may be possible to influence others’ action with communication that
is welfare improving. However, because of the complementarities between individual
decisions, in order to be informative, communication must be able to reveal truthful
information in an incentive compatible way.
In this chapter, I provide a model of communication and test the theoretical pre-
dictions of the model with an experiment. In the model of communication presented
here, individuals must make a costly investment decision in the presence of uncer-
tainty and social complementarities. Individuals receive additive payoffs for each
member of their network who invests but they pay the cost of their own investment
only. In the model, individuals first communicate with their networks. After sending
and receiving messages, all individuals make simultaneous investment decisions. I
show that effective communication is possible only when individual have access to a
costly communication technology. In equilibrium, I predict that a separating equilib-
rium will exist, where individuals with good information will “burn money” in order
7to send a credible and informative message about their private information. I also
show that when individuals derive heterogeneous returns from their investment, the
amount that they invest to send a message is increasing in their return from investing
and decreasing in the return of the person they are communicating with.
The experimental test of this model is done in the laboratory with two person
networks. I compare a treatment with no communication to two communication
treatment: one in which messages are free and another in which messages vary in
positive costs. I find that while subjects in the experiment are more likely to be
influenced by messages that are more costly, they do not fully take this into account
when deciding whether to send a message. In fact, subjects are most willing to send
messages when messages are free or low cost, even though these messages are not
as influential. As a result, while the ability to send messages improves welfare, the
probability of choosing the correct action is the same regardless of whether messages
are free or costly. Hence, welfare improvements are found only in the free messages
treatment.
Crawford and Sobel (1982) provide one of the first analyses of strategic commu-
nication. In their model, there is an asymmetry between information and action.
One individual (the sender) receives private information and he must decide what
information to provide to the receiver, who is the only one with the power to make
decisions. This work on strategic communication is advanced by Austen Smith and
Banks (2000) who illustrate that a larger set of communication equilibria are possible
when individuals can send costly signals. Austen Smith and Banks (2002) illustrate
what kind of communication occurs when both cheap talk and costly signaling are
possible.
The Crawford and Sobel model is designed to provide insight into a class of prob-
lems related to bargaining when individuals have different information and decision
making power. In my model, while the possibility for welfare improving communi-
8cation comes from individuals’ private information, there is an incentive compati-
bility problem due to positive externalities from the investment decisions of others.
My model addresses situations where symmetric agents both make decisions about
whether to communicate and make an investment. While communication can occur
in Crawford and Sobel’s model for free in equilibrium, in my model communication
will only be effective if individuals send a costly signal in order to illustrate their
private information.
My model is also related to a class of models explaining advice. These models
compare the welfare properties when individuals can learn by passively observing in-
dividual actions (social learning) to when individuals are given advice.1 In models
of advice, the benefit to providing advice is exogenous and occurs only if the advice
results in the right decision. These models differ from a situation where individuals
attempt to socially influence their friends for strategic reasons. In my model, individ-
uals pay to develop a communication network because there are strategic benefits due
to the complementarities between individual choices. Individuals have something to
gain from others’ investment, regardless of whether that investment was cost effective.
Cai and Wang (2006) provide an empirical test of the Crawford and Sobel strategic
communication model. Their evidence suggests that while the comparative statics of
the model fit behavior well, individuals appear to be more likely to send messages
that provide information to another party than the theory would predict. As a result,
receivers of information are able to rely on this information more than would be
predicted in the theory. In related work, Dickinson, Hafer and Landa (2008) find that
subjects given positions on an issue scale and asked to deliberate have a tendency
to overcommunicate, expressing their positions even when strategically they would
benefit more from being silent. In the experiment, subjects tend to send informative
messages more than the model would predict when messages are free. However, when
1C¸elen, Kariv and Schotter (2007) and Chaudhuri, Schotter and Sopher (2001)
9messages come at some cost, individuals do not invest as often as we would predict.
For this reason, the highest levels of welfare occur when messages are free.
Other experimental and theoretical studies that feature “burning money” and
cheap talk as part of their equilibrium concept have focused primarily on coordina-
tion games.2 In many of these games, individuals benefit from others’ actions only
when they can coordinate, creating incentives to send costly signals as a way to select
between equilibria. In these experiments, the possibility of burning money is suffi-
cient and on the equilibrium path, individuals will not burn money (Hurkens 1994).
Nonetheless, similar to evidence from the experiment presented here, experimental
evidence on whether subjects act strategically is mixed. In experiments designed to
determine whether individuals act optimally when they have the possibility to burn
money, Huck and Mu¨ller’s (2005) results indicate that subjects’ behavior is not consis-
tent with equilibrium predictions, except when the game is played in extensive form.
Since these experiments do not predict that subjects should burn money, it could
be that deviations from strategic behavior may be magnified when burning money
occurs on the equilibrium path.
The structure of my model is adapted from the work of Calvo-Armengol and Jack-
son 2009 (hereafter CJ) on peer pressure (2009). In their model, individuals make a
costly investment in order to reduce the cost of taking action for their networks. There
is a direct analogy between the the direct benefit to others’ utility that is possible in
the CJ model of pressure and the information benefit of costly communication in the
model I develop here. Individuals will pay for costly messages if they are effective. In
my model, messages are effective because individuals have private information, while
in CJ’s model, pressure has a direct impact on decisions by changing the costs of
taking action. The focus of the CJ model of peer pressure is primarily participation
games, games in which individuals receive payoffs only if they participate. In con-
2Charness and Grosskopf (2001) and Duffy and Feltovich (2002); Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991)
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trast, my model focuses on a game in which individuals may benefit from the actions
of others’ even when they do not participate. It is not always clear that individuals
with common interests will be able to credibly affect the costs of others’ actions as
assumed in the CJ model. In the example provided here, it is more natural to as-
sume that individuals may be able to communicate but not to directly influence the
costs and benefits of others. In the presence of uncertainty, it may be possible to
send costly signals as a way of communicating private information that will influence
others, even when it is not possible to directly change their cost-benefit calculation.
2.2 Model
In this model, individuals make a simultaneous decision about whether to make an
investment that externalities. An individual’s investment decision is represented by
the binary variable x. Individuals also benefit from others’ investment. The cost of
an individual’s investment is represented by c and paid only by the individual making
the investment.
Before individuals decide whether to invest, they are uncertain about the benefits
of investment. The benefit to investment varies by a factor aω, where the state of
the world ω is either G or B and aG > aB. Individuals receive a private signal si
about the state of the world. Their signal is correct with probability q > 1
2
, so that
P (aω = aG|si = G) = q. The payoffs to investing can be represented by
U(xi, x−i, aω) = aω
(∑
j
xj
)
− cxi.
I will first consider a two person group. For any individual who receives a good signal,
11
the expected utilities from investing and not investing are
EU(xi = 1|si) = E (aω (1 + E(xj)) |si)− c
EU(xi = 0|si) = E (aω (E(xj)) |si) .
When individuals have only their private information, they will invest if the expected
utility is greater than the expected utility of not investing. That is, individuals will
invest if and only if
E(aω|si) ≥ c.
It is useful to note that an individual’s decision about whether to invest does not
depend on others’ investment decisions. Furthermore, individuals are uniformly better
off when their partners invest. Ex-ante social welfare when individuals have only their
private information can be written as
W (x, ω) = (E(xi|si) + E(xj|sj)) (aω − c).
Individuals receive welfare from the expected benefits from investing minus the cost
of the investment.
Naturally, improvements in welfare would be possible if individuals could share
information. When individuals share all information, ex-ante social welfare with two
individuals can be defined as
Ws(x, ω) = (E(xi|si, sj) + E(xj|si, sj)) (aω − c).
Because individuals have more information, they are more likely to invest when there
are positive returns and not to invest when those returns are negative. Therefore,
12
welfare improvements are possible when information is shared. However, because
individuals uniformly benefit from the investment of others, regardless of whether
the benefits justify the costs, individuals cannot credibly communicate their private
information. If individuals were prevented from lying, whether by repercussions or
by some cost of lying, it would be possible to achieve the best-case scenario for
welfare. However, as long as individual communications are discounted because of
the incentives to misrepresent, it is not possible to achieve this outcome.
2.2.1 Social Influence
In the presence of complementarities from others’ actions, individuals have an incen-
tive to influence the actions of their friends. I define influence as any communication
that changes behavior. When information is free, informative communication is not
possible. However, if there were some way for individuals to reveal their private in-
formation credibly, welfare improvements could be made by sharing information. I
provide a model of communication between symmetric individuals making investment
decisions with positive social externalities.
I adapt a model proposed by Jackson and Calvo-Armengol (2007) that was de-
signed to analyze the theoretical implications of peer pressure. Unlike the CJ model,
individuals in my model cannot change the cost of others in their network. Instead
they hope to influence the actions of others in their social group by communicating
with them. Individuals first chose whether to pay to send a message to others in their
network and if so, to whom to send a message. Individuals then receive any messages
sent from others in the group. Individuals may send one of two messages: {Invest,
Don’t invest}. After receiving all messages, all individuals in the group make their
investment decision simultaneously.
I assume there is some fixed cost ρ > 0 of influence and individuals may choose
to send a message or not. If individual i choses to send a message to j, pij = 1 and
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if individual i does not send a message to individual j, then pij = 0. The cost of
a message is chosen from ρ ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,Ψ}. Individual utility when individuals can
communicate by investing in messages can be represented as
U(xi, x−i, aω, ρ, pij) = aω
(∑
j
xj
)
− cxi − ρ
∑
j
pij.
For simplicity, I assume that individuals who are indifferent between sending and not
sending a message will choose not to communicate.
2.2.2 Free Messages
In order to consider how individual behavior changes in the presence of messages,
I again focus on the two individual case. Let us first consider what happens in
equilibrium when messages are free. Since individuals benefit from their friend’s
investment, regardless of the true state of the world, individuals will have an incentive
convince each other to invest regardless of their private signal, it is impossible for
messages to reveal any actual information. Therefore, in equilibrium, a message is
not credible and no messages will be sent.
2.2.3 Costly Messages
While no information can be effectively communicated when messages are free, it is
possible to share information when individuals can send costly signals. In order to
be effective in influencing others, costly messages must be able to credibly separate
those who have received a good signal from those who have received a bad signal.
In order for a message to separate individuals with good signals from those with
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bad signals, the message cost ρ must satisfy the following two conditions
E(aω|si = G, sj) (E(xj|si = G, pij = 1)− E(xj|si = G, pij = 0)) ≥ ρ;
E(aω|si = B, sj) (E(xj|si = B, pij = 1)− E(xj|si = B, pij = 0)) < ρ.
That is, it must be that the expected benefit of sending a message exceeds the cost
for individuals who have received a good signal, while the expected benefit is below
the cost for those who have received a bad signal.
In the presence of such a separating equilibrium, all private information will be
revealed. Individuals who have received a good signal will send a message that reveals
their signal. Individuals who have received a bad signal will not send a message, also
revealing their signal. Therefore individual investment decisions will be made with
full shared information. In the presence of full shared information, an agent will
invest if the expected benefit given all available information exceeds the cost
E(aω|si, sj) ≥ c.
In equilibrium, messages will only be sent if they are expected to change behavior.
Therefore, the existence of a costly influence equilibrium depends on the cost of
investment. In the two-person example, there are two regions where a separating
equilibrium exists, one in which individuals are influenced by messages if they have
received a bad signal and another in which individuals are influenced by messages
only if they have received a good signal. Cost parameters consistent with a signaling
equilibrium either fall in the range cG, where
cG = {c : E(aω|si = G, sj = B) < c < E(aω|si = G, sj = G)}
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so that the cost falls between the expected value of investing with one good signal
and two good signals or cB where
cB = {c : E(aω|si = B, sj = B) < c < E(aω|si = G, sj = B)}
and the cost falls within the range where at least one good signal is needed to invest.
Therefore for costs in the range cG, the expected change in investment by one’s
partner as a result of sending a credible message is
E(xj|si = G, pij = 1)− E(xj|si = G, pij = 0) = P (sj = G|si = G)). (2.1)
When costs fall in range cG, the expected change in investment from a message is
simply the probability that one’s partner has received a good signal, conditional on
receiving a good signal. For costs in the range cB, the expected expected change in
investment by one’s partner as a result of sending a credible message is
E(xj|si = G, pij = 1)− E(xj|si = G, pij = 0) = P (sj = B|si = G). (2.2)
The expected change in investment from a credible message in cost range cB is simply
the probability of one’s partner having received a bad signal, given that the individual
received a good signal.
A separating equilibrium will always exist when costs fall in the range of cG. When
costs fall in this range, an individual j will change their investment behavior after
receiving a message only when they have received a good signal. Therefore, the benefit
of sending a signal is simply the expectation of the benefit from investment which
will always be higher when individuals i has received a good signal. Furthermore,
the probability of individual j responding to a message (which occurs only when
individual j already received one good signal) is higher when individual i received a
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good signal: P (sj = G|si = G) > P (sj = G|si = B). Therefore, when individuals
receive a good signal in cost range cG, the benefits to sending messages will always
be higher when si = G than when si = B and therefore a separating equilibrium will
always exist.
When costs fall in the range of cB, it is only possible to successfully influence the
actions of individuals who have received a signal of B. Therefore, while the expected
benefit from influencing another individual is higher when an individual receives a
good signal: E(aω|si = G, sj = B) > E(aω|si = B, sj = B), the probability that the
attempt to influence will be successful is lower: P (sj = B|si = G) < P (sj = B|si =
G). Therefore, the existence of ρ that constitutes a separating equilibrium depends
on q, the quality of information. Figure ?? illustrates that there are a range of q
for which this condition is met. Note that as q approaches 1, it will no longer be
possible that there exists some ρ that satisfies the condition that only an individual
with a good signal will be willing to send a message. This is because as q approaches
1, it becomes very unlikely that investing in a message will be effective in changing
behavior, since it is the probability of an individual receiving a bad signal is very low
when another agent has received a good signal. Let us define
ρGG = E(aω|si = G, sj = G)P (si = G|sj = G);
ρGB = E(aω|si = B, sj = G)P (si = G|sj = B);
ρBB = E(aω|si = B, sj = B)P (si = B|sj = B);
and q¯ = aG
aG+aB
. With these definitions, I formalize these intuitions with proposition
2.2.1.
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I can characterize the existence of a separating equilibrium as follows
Case 1: For costs c ∈ cG
• Separating Equilibrium: pij(si = G) = 1 and pij(si = B) = 0 when ρGB <
ρ < ρGG
• Silent Equilibrium: pij(si = G) = pij(si = B) = 0 otherwise
Case 2: For costs c ∈ cB
• Separating Equilibrium: pij(si = G) = 1 and pij(si = B) = 0 when ρBB <
ρ < ρGB and q < q¯
• Silent Equilibrium: pij(si = G) = pij(si = B) = 0 otherwise
Case 3: For costs c /∈ cB ∪ cG
• Silent Equilibrium: pij(si = G) = pij(si = B) = 0.
All proofs are provided in the appendix.
2.2.4 Costly Messages with Known Heterogeneity
Now I consider what happens if individual benefits from investing differ, so that the
individual benefit from the sum of others’ investment is multiplied by ti ∈ [tL, tH ]
where tH > tL, so that t denotes the vector of types. I assume that individual types
are common knowledge. Individual utility can now be represented as
U(xi, x−i, aω, ρ, pij, ti) = tiaω
(∑
j
xj
)
− cxi − ρ
∑
j
pij.
When individuals receive different returns from the investment and these returns are
common knowledge, the required cost of effective communication will differ according
18
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Figure 2.1. Representation of gains from communicating
to the types of the individuals sending and receiving messages. Now, in order for a
separating equilibrium to exist, the following conditions must be met:
tiE(aω|si = G, pij = 1) (E(xj|si = G, pij = 1)− E(xj|si = G, pij = 0)) ≥ ρ;
tiE(aω|si = B, pij = 1) (E(xj|si = B, pij = 1)− E(xj|si = B, pij = 0)) < ρ.
As before, the expected benefit of sending a message must be higher than the cost
for individuals who have received a good signal and the expected benefit of sending
a message must be below the cost for individuals who have received a bad signal.
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However, with individual heterogeneity, the expected benefit from sending a mes-
sage depends on the the type of both the sender and receiver of the message. The
expected benefit depends on the receiver’s type because the receiver’s type will deter-
mine when they might be influenced by a message (i.e., whether they are more likely
to be influenced when they have received good or bad private information). The
expected benefit depends on the sender’s type because the benefit to their partner’s
investment depends on their type.
The existence of a separating equilibrium will again depend on the level of cost
required to invest. However, there are now four relevant ranges of costs to consider:
cB(ti) = {c : E(aω|si = B, sj = B) < c
ti
≤ E(aω|si = G, sj = B)} for ti = H,L;
cG(ti) = {c : E(aω|si = G, sj = B) < c
ti
≤ E(aω|si = G, sj = G)} for ti = H,L.
The possibility of changing the investment decisions of one’s partner depends on one’s
partner’s type.
The optimal message now depends on ti (because individuals who benefit more
must spend more to signal) and tj (because individuals with a higher type will be
influenced to act at a lower information threshold than individuals with a lower type).
The cost at which a separating equilibrium exists for credible messages is increasing
in ti and decreasing in tj. Furthermore, when individuals have differing returns from
investment, not all individuals will make the same decision with respect to sending
and receiving messages. It may be that certain types do not receive messages in
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equilibrium, while other types never send messages in equilibrium. Let us define
ρGG(ti) = tiE(aω|si = G, sj = G)P (si = G|sj = G);
ρGB(ti) = tiE(aω|si = B, sj = G)P (si = G|sj = B);
ρBB(ti) = tiE(aω|si = B, sj = B)P (si = B|sj = B).
These results are summarized in proposition 2.2.2:
I can characterize the existence of a separating equilibrium as follows:
Case 1: For costs c ∈ cG(tj)
• Separating Equilibrium: pij(si = G) = 1 and pij(si = B) = 0 when
ρGB(ti) < ρ < ρGG(ti)
• Silent Equilibrium: pij(si = G) = pij(si = B) = 0 otherwise.
Case 2: For costs c ∈ cB(tj)
• Separating Equilibrium: pij(si = G) = 1 and pij(si = B) = 0 when
ρBB(ti) < ρ < ρGB(ti) and q < q¯
• Silent Equilibrium: pij(si = G) = pij(si = B) = 0 otherwise.
Case 3: For costs c /∈ cB(tj) ∪ cG(tj)
• Silent Equilibrium: pij(si = G) = pij(si = B) = 0.
2.3 Experimental Design
The theoretical model was tested in a laboratory experiment using groups of size two.
2.3.1 Experimental Treatments
In all three treatment, individuals decide whether to make an investment. The suc-
cess of their investment depends on the realization of the state of the world. They
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receive payoffs from their own investment and their partner’s investment. In all of
our treatments the value of investing in the good state of the world (purple) was 200
points, while the value of investing when the state of the world was bad (green) was
10 points. The cost of investing was fixed at 125 points and paid only for their own
investment.3
In the Control treatment, individuals made their decisions about whether to
invest without receiving any information from their partner. In the Free Messages
treatment, individuals may send a message at no cost. In the Costly Messages
treatment, the price of the message is drawn from a uniform distribution between 10
and 120 points. The states, information signals and messages were simulated in the
experiment as follows:4
States: Each of the two states was a jar of marbles called the green jar and the purple
jar.5 Purple represents a good state of the world (ω = G) while green represents
a bad state of the world (ω = B). In the experiment, each jar contained 10
marbles: the green jar consisted of 6 green marbles and 4 purple marbles while
the purple jar consisted of 6 purple marbles and 4 green marbles. At the outset
of each period, one of the jars was chosen at random, with each jar being equally
likely. A representation of the image seen by subjects to explain how the state
of the world is chosen is presented in figure ??.
Signals: In each round of the experiments, subjects received a signal consisting of
one draw from the jar of marbles with replacement. The probability of the
marble chosen being the same as the color of the jar was 60%. We therefore
simulate a quality of information q = 0.6.
Messages: In some treatments, subjects could send a message to their partner con-
3In all experiments, one point was equivalent to 1 cent.
4The full experimental instructions are available at: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/˜mmcconnell/instructions.zip
5Purple and green were considered to be neutral colors with no obvious external affiliation.
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taining a suggestion about which action to take. If a subject decided to send a
message, they could send one of the following two messages:
Suggestion A: Invest
Suggestion B: Don’t Invest
A body of experimental evidence suggests that subjects are averse to lying (Sanchez-
Pages and Vorsatz 2009; Kartik 2009; Hurkens and Kartik 2009; Gneezy 2005). This
experiment was designed to abstract away from lying in order to focus specifically on
whether subjects attempt to influence others. Therefore, the messages were chosen so
that subjects did not have to make statements about what their own decision would
be, thereby removing the possibility that subjects made decisions that depended on
norms about lying. The messages were chosen to approximate attempts to influence
the actions of others as closely as possible.
The costs and benefits of investment, the distribution of message costs and the dis-
tribution of types were all common knowledge. Message costs were identical for every
person in an experimental session and this was common knowledge. In each round,
individuals were randomly assigned a partner from the pool of all other subjects in
their experiment. This assignment process was common knowledge.
Prior to the experiment, subjects were given a worksheet which calculated the
expected value of investing in two cases: (a) the subject receives only one signal
(i.e., only their private information) and (b) the subjects receives two signals (i.e.,
their information and their partner’s information).6 At the start of the experiment,
subjects received instructions. After the end of the instructions, subjects participated
in 30 periods of decisions. Each period consisted of the following five steps:
(1) Information In the information stage, subjects did not take any action. They
6Subjects were provided with calculations of expected value in order to reduce the number of
simple calculation errors in the experiment.
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were informed about: the signal they received that period, their payoff param-
eter in that period, their partner’s payoff parameter in that period, the two
messages that could be sent and the cost of sending a message (if applicable).
(2) Sending In the sending stage, subjects could choose (simultaneously) to send a
message to their partner.
(3) Receiving In the receiving stage, subjects were informed of whether they re-
ceived a message from their partner and which message they received.
4) Decision In the decision stage, subjects decided whether or not to invest.
5) Feedback In the feedback stage, subjects received information about the deci-
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sions made by their partner and the payoff they received in that period. Subjects
recorded their decisions and the payoff they received in each period on a record
sheet.7
Subjects in all treatments first participated in 15 rounds of a Homogeneous
condition and then participated in 15 rounds of a Heterogeneous condition. In the
Homogeneous condition, all subjects had the same payoff parameter of one. In the
Heterogeneous condition, subjects were assigned to either a payoff parameter of
one (1) or a payoff parameter of one point five (1.5). Subjects were assigned to one
payoff parameter for each condition and subjects were assigned to a different payoff
parameter than their partner.
Table 2.1 represent the parameters implemented in the experiment.
Table 2.1. Parameters
Variable Value
q 0.60
aG 200
aB 10
c 125
tH 1.5
tL 1
p ∼ U [10, 120]
2.3.2 Theoretical Predictions
The payoff and strategic structure of the model is maintained throughout the exper-
iment. We can use the theoretical model to make predictions about behavior for the
parameters chosen in the experiment.
7The record sheet was designed to facilitate subjects’ understanding of the experiment, as they
would be able to observe the outcomes for different decisions.
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Investment Predictions
First we consider the predictions made by the model about individual investment in
the three treatments. In table 2.2 we provide the expected value of investing when
individuals receive only one signal (only the private information) and when individual
receive two signals (their information and their partner’s information). Based on
these expected values, we also provide theoretical predictions for when individuals
should invest, given their information. In the Control, individuals have only their
own signal and no ability to communicate and will be constrained to make the best
decision given only their own signal. Therefore, in the Control treatment, we would
expect that individuals with a low type should never invest, since investing always has
negative expected value. Individuals with a high type should invest in the Control
treatment if and only if they have received a good signal.
Table 2.2. Theoretical predictions about investment behavior
Low Type
Signal(s) EV of Investment Theoretical Investment Prediction
Good 124 NO
Bad 86 NO
Good, Good 142 YES
Good, Bad 105 NO
Bad, Bad 68 NO
High Type
Signal(s) EV of Investment Theoretical Investment Prediction
Good 186 YES
Bad 129 YES
Good, Good 212 YES
Good, Bad 158 YES
Bad, Bad 103 NO
In the Free Messages treatment, messages cannot be informative, since individuals
have an incentive to misrepresent their information and no way to credibly signal their
information. Therefore, the theoretical model predicts that there will be no difference
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in the investment rate in the Control treatment and the Free Messages treatment.
When messages are costly, individuals may be able to send messages that are
informative, provided that the message cost is high enough so that individuals who
receive a bad signal will not be willing to send a message. If the price of a message is
above the expected benefit of sending a message for an individual who has received
a bad signal, the message will be credible. In table 2.2, we present the expected
benefit of sending a message by individual type and signal. Therefore, we predict an
individual should consider a message to be informative in the following ranges:
• They are a low type, their partner is a low type and the cost of the message is
ρ > 50.4;
• They are a low type, their partner is a high type and the cost of the message is
ρ > 35.6;
• They are a high type, their partner is a low type and the cost of the message is
ρ > 75.6.
When these conditions are met in the experiment, we will call this the Informative
Message Range (receive).
Within these ranges, individuals will effectively receive two signals. They will
receive their own signal directly and they will be informed about the signal received
by their partner indirectly. This is because if individuals receive a message suggesting
that they invest, they know it can only be truthful since sending a message would
have negative expected value if their partner had received a bad signal. If they do
not receive a message, they can infer that their partner has received a bad signal. In
the presence of two independent signals, individuals with a low type should invest if
and only if they receive two good signals. Individuals with a high type should invest
if and only if they receive at least one good signal.
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Communication Predictions
In addition to considering what the theory predicts about individual investment de-
cisions, we also consider the predictions made by the theory in terms of when indi-
viduals should communicate in the Free Messages and Costly Messages treatments.
As discussed above, informative communication is not possible in the Free Messages
treatment - since no messages can be effective, individuals will not communicate.8
Table 2.3. Theoretical predictions about separating equilibrium for sending a message
Signal Low to Low Low to High High to Low
Good 73.6 50.4 110.4
Bad 50.4 35.6 75.6
In the Costly Messages treatment, individuals will be able to send informative
messages if and only if the cost of the message exceeds the expected benefit of sending
a message for an individual receiving a bad signal. Individuals will therefore be willing
to send a message if the cost exceeds the level required to signal their good information
but still has positive net expected benefit. From table 2.3, we can see that individuals
will be willing to send a message if and only if they following conditions are met:
• They are a low type, their partner is a low type and the cost of the message is
50.4 < ρ < 73.6 and they have received a good signal.
• They are a low type, their partner is a high type and the cost of the message is
35.6 < ρ < 50.4 and they have received a good signal.
• They are a high type, their partner is a low type and the cost of the message is
75.6 < ρ < 110.4 and they have received a good signal.
When these conditions are met in the experiment, we will call this the Informative
Message Range (send).
8This is because we have assumed that when indifferent, individuals will not communicate.
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2.3.3 Implementation
A total of 54 subjects recruited from Caltech participated in the experiments. Sub-
jects were recruited by emails in the standard procedure for the laboratory. Six
subjects participated in each session for 30 rounds of decision making. The imple-
mentation of the sessions is summarized in table 2.4. Total payments (including a $5
show-up fee) ranged from a minimum of $12.35 to a maximum of $33.45.
Table 2.4. Experimental sessions
Treatment # of Sessions # of Subjects Average Payoff
No Messages (Control) 4 24 $20.33
Free Messages 3 18 $24.33
Costly Messages 2 12 $20.40
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Aggregate Behavior
We first consider investment rates across the treatment. Figure ?? illustrates in-
vestment rates across treatments for good and bad signals. We notice significantly
higher rates of investment than what the theory would predict. This over-investment
means that individuals may not have had a strong incentive to influence the behavior
of others, since investment often occurred without any additional information from
communication.
We also consider the likelihood of communication across the treatments. Figure
?? illustrates communication rate (the probability of sending a message in a given
period) across the Free and Costly Messages treatments for low types communicating
to low types, low types communicating to high types and high types communicating
to low types. We see substantially higher communication rates in the Free Messages
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Figure 2.3. Treatment effects on investment rates
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treatment than the Costly Messages treatment. Furthermore, we see that individuals
in both treatments are more likely to send a message when they have received a good
signal. This suggests that the messages in Free Message treatment contain more
information than we would predict.
In order to consider the welfare effects of treatment, we provide summary statistics
of profits throughout the experiment in table 2.5.
Table 2.5. Summary statistics (means with standard errors in parentheses)
Treatment Profits
No Messages (Control) 51.11
(7.26)
Free Messages 64.44
(6.10)
Costly Messages 51.32
(4.83)
N 1620
We do not see any evidence that the outcomes across treatments are consistent
with a separating equilibrium, where messages are informative only when individuals
invest above some threshold which reveals their type. In fact, it appears that the
ability to communicate with another person when making an investment decision is
likely to improve an individual’s decision making, regardless of whether those mes-
sages are costly. Since messages are costly and similar outcomes can be achieved
when messages are free, messages that are costly will not necessarily improve welfare
as our model would have predicted. We can see confirmation of this intuition in ta-
ble 2.5 where we present summary statistics on profits throughout the experiment.
As further evidence, in figure ??, we present the empirical distribution functions of
profits in each of the three treatments. We can see that payoffs in the free messages
treatment stochastically dominate payoffs in the control. In the paid treatment, the
fact that there is no improvement in the ability to communicate, but an increased
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Figure 2.4. Treatment effects on communication rates
Key: (A) Communication rates for low types communicating with low types (by signal).
(B) Communication rates for low types communicating with high types (by signal). (C)
Communication rates for high types communicating with low types (by signal). Error bars
denote SEMs.
32
cost to communication implies lower profits in the aggregate.9
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Figure 2.5. Empirical CDF of profits
We then provide a measure of whether individuals made the correct decision from
the point of view of the decision that provides greater expected value. We define a
“correct” decision as the decision to adopt when the aggregate information from both
individuals implies that investing has positive expected value and not to adopt when
the information available implies negative expected value. This measure allows us to
compare decisions to the experiment to the ones that would have been made in the
presence of complete information sharing.10
Using a nonparametric Mann-Whitney test, we can see that the subjects are
significantly more likely to make the correct decision when they have the ability to
9A Mann-Whitney test confirms that profits are significantly lower in the paid treatments, z=1.89.
10This measure also considers decision making within the actual draws of the experiment. That
is, subjects can only do as well as the information they are given.
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send messages, regardless of whether the messages are costly.11 Furthermore, subjects
are equally likely to make the correct decision, regardless of whether communication
is costly.12
However, this analysis does not consider possible dependencies that arise because
the same individual makes many decisions in the experiment. Furthermore, addi-
tional dependences may arise at the level of the experimental session since through
the random assignment process, individuals will repeatedly interact with the same
individuals in their experimental session. Therefore we develop an estimation strat-
egy that allows us to account for variation due to differences in individuals and at
the level of the session. We estimate regressions using random effects at the level of
the individual, clustering the standard errors at the level of the experimental session.
In table 2.6 model 1 we consider the effects of our treatments on the probability of
making the “correct” decision. We consider the effect of the ability to send any mes-
sage (free or paid) and find that the ability to send messages increases the probability
of making the correct decision by 10%. Confirming the results from nonparametric
tests, we see no additional effect of the probability of making the correct decision
when messages are costly. Model 2 of table 2.6 also suggests that the price of sending
a message does not affect the probability of making a correct decision.
2.4.2 Individual Behavior
In order to understand why costly messages did not improve accuracy and welfare,
we examine two components of individual behavior: the decision to invest and the
decision to send a message.
11Mann-Whitney tests yield z-statistics of -3.29 and -2.36 when comparing free and paid treatments
to control.
12Mann-Whitney test statistic of 1.25.
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Table 2.6. Correct decisions
Random Effects Estimation
(Correct decision)
Variable Model 1 Model 2
High Type -0.027 -0.024
(0.036) (0.037)
Partner High Type -0.016 -0.013
(0.028) (0.028)
Message Treatment 0.103∗∗ 0.095∗
(0.047) (0.051)
Paid Message Treatment -0.032 -0.007
(0.035) (0.045)
Message Cost - -0.000
- (0.000)
ρ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
Breusch Pagan LM statistic (21.47) (21.52)
Constant 0.646∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.036)
Observations 1620 1620
Number of individuals 54 54
Robust Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%
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2.4.2.1 Investment Decisions
In table 2.7 we can see that being in a treatment where it is possible to communicate
with your partner decreases the probability of making an investment by approximately
10%. However, when we consider the investment decisions of subjects who did receive
a message, we see that on the whole, they are approximately 4% more likely to invest.
Investment responses are consistent with the intuition of the equilibrium strategies
predicted by our model: subjects who are in the message treatment and receive no
message are less likely to invest, while subjets who do receive a message are more
likely to invest. Furthermore, in model 3 of table 2.7 we can see that subjects who
receive messages are 4% more likely to invest for every 10 point increase in the cost of
sending that message. This evidence suggests that subjects’ investment decisions do
respond more to messages when individuals pay some cost to send those messages.
We also consider whether individuals are more likely to respond to a message
when it falls in the equilibrium range. In model 3 of table 2.7 we consider the subset
of individuals in the paid message treatment who received a message. The variable
Informative Message Range (receive) is a dummy equal to 1 if the cost of the message
received was above the level required to signal that a good message was received.
We find that individuals are significantly more likely to listen to a message that falls
within the equilibrium range and that the increase is large. Subjects are 62.7% more
likely to invest if they receive a message in the equilibrium range. We also include an
interaction between Informative Message Range (receive) and the message cost. Once
individuals have gotten above the threshold required to signal their good informaiton,
our model would predict that messages would be equally effective, regardless of their
price. We see that subjects do not respond significantly more to messages that are
more costly within the equilibrium range. This also provides evidence against the
idea that subjects might be more likely to invest when they receive a costly message
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because of reciprocity.
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2.4.2.2 Communication Decisions
We now examine individual decisions about when to communicate in our experiment.
We use regression analysis to explain subjects’ decisions of whether to send a message
to their partner. For this analysis, we confine our analysis to treatments where
subjects could send messages. In model 4 if table 2.7, we see that subjects are
50% less likely to send messages in the paid treatment than when messages are free.
Furthermore, subjects’ willingness to send messages decreases with message costs.
For each 10 point increase in the cost of sending a message, subjects are 3.7% less
likely to send a message.
In model 4 of table 2.7 we consider whether subjects are more likely to send
a message under the conditions predicted by our theory: a) they receive a good
signal and b) the message price implies the existence of a a separating equilibrium.13
The variable Informative Message Range (send) indicates a message cost within the
equilibrium range and a good signal. We find that subjects are 8% more likely to
send messages when the message cost falls within the equilibrium range. Within this
equilibrium range, model 5 of table 2.7 shows that subjects are 2% less likely to send
a message for every 10 point increase in the cost of the message.
If we consider the upper tail of the 95 % confidence interval on the probability of
sending a message in the equilibrium range, subjects are at most 18% more likely to
send a message when the cost is in the equilibrium range. However, from our analysis
in model 3 of table 2.7, we know that subjects who received costly messages in the
equilibrium range were more than 60% more likely to act on those messages. This
asymmetry suggests that we see more of the intuition behind the burning money equi-
13Note that the definition of an equilibrium for sending messages is different from the equilibrium
for acting on messages. When considering how investment decisions respond to messages, we consider
an equilibrium price to be any price above the price required to separate a good signal from a
bad signal. When considering how individuals decide whether to send messages, we consider an
equilibrium price range to be above the price required for a separating equilibrium and below the
price at which the message will no longer provide increases in expected returns.
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Table 2.7. Determinants of investment and communication
Random Effects Estimation
(Invest) (Communicate)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
High type 0.166∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.045 0.067∗
(0.046) (0.046) (0.074) (0.028) (0.037)
Partner High Type -0.108∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.085 -0.032 0.036
(0.046) (0.046) (0.074) (0.028) (0.037)
Good Signal 0.572∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗ - 0.141∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.045) - (0.033) (0.034)
Message Treatment -0.097∗ -0.083 - - -
(0.061) (0.075) - - -
Received Message 0.147∗∗∗ 0.097 - - -
(0.061) (0.075) - - -
Message Cost - 0.004∗∗∗ - -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
- (0.002) - (0.001) (0.001)
Received Message*Message Cost - - 0.007 - -
- - (0.006) - -
Informative Message (Receive) - - 0.627∗∗ - -
- - (0.280) - -
Informative Message (Receive)*Message Cost - - -0.010 - -
- - (0.008) - -
Costly Messages - - - -0.495∗∗∗ -0.496∗∗∗
- - - (0.067) (0.067)
Informative Message (Send) - - - - 0.089∗∗
- - - - (0.045)
Informative Message (Send)*Message Cost - - - - -0.003∗∗
- - - - (0.001)
ρ 0.14∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.00 0.17∗∗ 0.18∗∗
Breusch Pagan LM statistic (407.95) (399.97) (0.02) (496.67) (513.14)
Constant 0.120∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.769∗∗∗ 0.757∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.061) (0.082) (0.019) (0.021)
Observations 1620 1620 79 1260 1260
Number of individuals 54 54 22 42 42
Robust Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*significant at 10%, *significant at 5%, *significant at 1%
Model 3 represents the subset of individuals in the paid treatment who sent a message.
Models 4 and 5 represent the subset of individuals in the free or paid message treatments.
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librium for subjects’ behavior as receivers than as senders. When sending messages,
subjects did not fully account for the relatively greater effectivness of messages sent
at a cost and favored messages that are sent at low cost.
By examining individual behavior in different cost ranges more closely, we can
see that subjects are actually more likely to send messages when the cost fall below
the range of informative messages than when the cost falls within the range where a
separating equilibrium exists. The adherence of individual communication behavior
to the predictions of the theory can be seen in figure ?? where we examine com-
municate rates for costs below the Informative Message Range, in the Informative
Message Range and above the Informative Message Range. We can see that for all
communication by all types, individuals are not more likely to send messages when
the cost falls in the range where a separating equilibrium exists, than they are when
costs fall below the Informative Message Range.
2.4.2.3 Learning
In order to determine whether subjects’ behavior changes over time, we consider
estimations that examine the possibility of learning in the experiment. We consider
how subjects investment decisions differ over time in models 1 and 2 of table 2.8.
Subjects are between 5% and 6% less likely to invest in later periods. Subjects are
also more willing to invest if they have been assigned a high type. Subjects are not
statistically significantly more likely to invest when their previous investment decision
gave them positive payoffs. Furthermore, there is no difference in the responsiveness
to a successful past investment decision when costly messages are available.
We also see no evidence that subjects are more likely to invest when their partner
has invested in the previous period and no evidence that responsiveness to past in-
vestment success is greater depending on the cost of messages in that period. There is
limited evidence suggesting that subject behavior with respect to investment adapts
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Key: (A) Communication rates for low types communicating with low types (by signal).
(B) Communication rates for low types communicating with high types (by signal). (C)
Communication rates for high types communicating with low types (by signal). Error bars
denote SEMs.
Figure 2.6. Communication rates for message costs below, within and above the cost
range in which a separating equilibrium exists
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or that learning about when to invest differs depending on the cost of messages.
In model 2 of table 2.8 we consider how subjects’ willingness to send messages
changes over time. On average, subjects do appear to exhibit some learning in the
experiment with respect to decisions about communication. Subjects are 10% more
likely to send a message if they sent a message that resulted in investment by their
partner in the previous period. We also examine whether subjects are more responsive
to prior success based on the cost of the message sent, but do not see any statistically
significant evidence of a different propensity to learn from the past that depends
on the cost of a message. We see no evidence that subjects are more likely to send
messages when their partner has sent a message, regardless of the cost of that message.
2.4.2.4 Informative Messages
The main intuition behind the separating equilibrium predicted by our theory is
driven by the fact that individuals are payoff maximizers; they will not reveal their
signal truthfully when they have incentives to misrepresent their information. How-
ever, the relative success of the free messages treatment suggests that the problem
of noninformative messages was not nearly as large as we would expect. In fact, we
find 61% of the time, individuals in the free treatment either accurately revealed their
signal or did not send any message at all. In contrast, 95% of the time, individuals
in the paid treatment accurately revealed their signal or did not send a message at
all. Furthermore, as we can see in model 3 of table 2.8, the probability of individuals
revealing their information accurately14 is increasing in the message cost. Individuals
are 1% more likely to reveal their information accurately for every 10 point increase
in message cost.
14We consider a message to reveal information accurately if you send a message that corresponds
to your private information if you did send a message, or sending no message at all.
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Table 2.8. Learning and truthful revelation
Random Effects Estimation
Learning Revelation
(Invested) (Sent a Message) (Informative)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Successful investment in previous period 0.076 - -
(0.056) - -
Successful investment in previous period*Message cost -0.001 - -
(0.001) - -
Partner invested in previous period -0.006 - -
(0.007) - -
Partner invested in previous period*Message Cost 0.000 - -
(0.000) - -
Period -0.006∗∗∗ -0.003 -
(0.002) (0.003) -
High Type 0.259∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.027
(0.055) (0.019) (0.014)
Partner High Type -0.010 0.024 -0.031∗∗
(0.036) (0.018) (0.014)
Good Signal 0.566∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.034) (0.108)
Message Cost -0.001 -0.005∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Messages -0.027 - -
(0.051) - -
Successful message in previous period - -0.107∗∗∗ -
- (0.030) -
Successful message in previous period*Message cost - 0.000 -
- (0.001) -
Partner sent message in previous period - -0.001 -
- (0.008) -
Partner sent message in previous period*Message cost - -0.000 -
- (0.000) -
Messages Paid - - 0.226∗∗∗
- - (0.035)
ρ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗
Breusch Pagan LM statistic (353.84) (585.77) (4.80)
Constant 0.181∗∗ 0.555∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.122) (0.064)
Observations 1566 1218 1260
Number of individuals 54 42 42
Robust Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*significant at 10%, *significant at 5%, *significant at 1%
First period decisions are excluded from model 1 and 2.
Model 2 and 3 are the subset of individuals who could send a message.
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2.5 Conclusion
The current chapter provides a model that sheds light on when it is possible for
individuals to influence the actions of others via communication. In our model, indi-
viduals can effectively influence their neighbors because of their private information,
unlike other models of influence like Calvo-Armengol and Jackson where individuals
can directly affect the costs of their neighbors. Therefore, my model can be applied
to a class of problems in which individuals may benefit from others’ investment be-
cause of complementarities but might not have be able to change the cost of their
investment.
In my model, I illustrate that communication can only be informative when in-
dividuals are able to communicate by incurring some cost, thereby sending a signal
which reveals their private information. In fact, practices designed to influence the
actions of others, such as a willingness to travel or take time out for face-to-face meet-
ings do not provide additional information content, but often come at a nontrivial
cost.
I test the implications of this model using laboratory experiments which com-
pare individuals’ decisions with no ability to communicate, when only cheap talk is
possible, and when they can send costly messages designed to influence. I find that
individuals do appear to send informative messages in the cheap talk treatment, in
contrast to the theoretical prediction. As a result, messages improve information qual-
ity even when they are merely cheap talk. When messages are costly, individuals are
more likely to be influenced by messages that were sent at a higher cost, as predicted
by the theory. However, when sending messages, individuals do not burn money to
the extent that our theory would predict. As a result, we see welfare improvements
over the control when messages are free but not when messages are costly.
Overall, our experimental results suggest that the ability to communicate can
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improve outcomes, even when individuals have some incentive to misrepresent their
private information because of complementarities from their friends’ decisions. While
the model predicts that individuals need to “burn money” in order to effectively
communicate, it may not always be welfare improving to develop institutions for costly
communication, especially if individuals tend to reveal their information accurately,
even without the ability to send a costly signal.
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2.6 Appendix
Proposition 2.2.1 Proof
Let us define the benefit of individual i sending a message to j as b(pij = 1|si).
Case 1
When c ∈ cG, j will not invest unless he receives two good signals. Hence if
messages are credible:
E(xj|pij = 1, sj = B) = 0;
E(xj|pij = 1, sj = G) = 1;
E(xj|pij = 0) = 0.
Using equation (2.1) from section 2.2.3 we can see that b(pij = 1|si) = ρGG and
b(pij = 1|si) = ρGB:
b(pij = 1|si = G) = E(aω|si = G, sj = G) (E(xj|pij = 1, sj = G)− E(xj|pij = 0, sj = G)
= E(aω|si = G, sj = G)P (si = G|sj = G)
= ρGG;
b(pij = 1|si = B) = E(aω|si = B, sj = G) (E(xj|pij = 1, sj = G)− E(xj|pij = 0, sj = G)
= E(aω|si = B, sj = G)P (si = B|sj = G)
= ρGB.
In order to illustrate that a separating equilibrium exists for all ρ in the range ρGB <
ρ < ρGG, we need only show that ρGG > ρGB for all q. Because we have shown that
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ρGG = b(pij = 1|si = G) and ρGB = b(pij = 1|si = G) we can write
ρGG = E(aω|si = G, sj = G)P (si = G|sj = G) = aGq2+(1−q)2aB(1−q)2+q2 ((1− q)2 + q2)
= aGq
2 + (1− q)2aB;
ρGB = E(aω|si = G, sj = G)P (si = G|sj = G) =
(
1
2
aG +
1
2
aB
)
(1− (1− q)2 − q2).
Therefore we need only to show that aGq
2 + (1− q)2aB > (q− q2)aG + (q− q2)aB for
all q. This follows from the observation that
aGq
2 + (1− q)2aB − (q − q2)aG − (q − q2)aB = q(2q − 1)aG − (1− q)(2q − 1)aB.
Since q > 1 − q for all q > 1
2
and aG > aB, we know that ρGG > ρGB and we have
shown that a separating equilibrium exists for all ρ such that ρGG > ρ > ρGB and
outside of this range, there will be no communication.
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Case 2
When c ∈ cB, j will not invest unless he receives at least one good signal. Hence
if messages are credible:
E(xj|pij = 1, sj = B) = 1;
E(xj|pij = 1, sj = G) = 1;
E(xj|pij = 0, sj = B) = 0;
E(xj|pij = 0, sj = G) = 1.
Using equation (2.2) in section 2.2.3 we now show that b(pij = 1|si = G) = ρGB and
b(pij = 1|si = B) = ρBB:
b(pij = 1|si = G) = E(aω|si = G, sj = B) (E(xj|pij = 1, sj = B)− E(xj|pij = 0, sj = B)
= E(aω|si = G, sj = G)P (sj = G|si = G)
= ρGB;
b(pij = 1|si = B) = E(aω|si = B, sj = B) (E(xj|pij = 1, sj = B)− E(xj|pij = 0, sj = B)
= E(aω|si = B, sj = G)P (sj = G|si = G)
= ρBB.
In order to illustrate that a separating equilibrium exists in the range ρGB < ρ < ρGG,
we need only show that ρGB > ρBB for all q. Because we have shown that ρGG =
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b(pij = 1|si = G) and ρGB = b(pij = 1|si = G) we can write
ρGB = b(pij = 1|si = G) = E(aω|si = G, sj = B)P (sj = B|si = G)
=
(
1
2
aG +
1
2
aB
)
(2q − 2q2);
ρBB = b(pij = 1|si = B) = E(aω|si = B, sj = B)P (sj = B|si = B)
= aG(1−q)
2+q2aB
(1−q)2+q2 ((1− q)2 + q2)
= aG(1− q)2 + q2aB.
Therefore we need to show that:
(
1
2
aG +
1
2
aB
)
(2q − 2q2) > aG(1− q)2 + q2aB
if and only if q < q¯. Let us now consider:
ρGB − ρBB = 12(aG + aB)(2q − 2q2)− aG(1− q)2 − q2aB
= (−2aG − 2aB)q2 + (3aG + aB)q − aG.
The roots of this quadratic function are q = 1
2
and q = aG
aG+aB
= q¯.
ρGB − ρBB is a quadratic function that is positive in the interval (12 , 1]. We know
that ρGB − ρBB > 0 when q = 1 since P (sj = B|si = G) = 0 when q = 1. Therefore
ρGB − ρBB ≥ 0 when q ∈ (12 , q¯] and ρGB − ρBB < 0 when q ∈ (q¯, 1] and a separating
equilibrium exists for all ρ in ρBB < ρ < ρGB if and only if q < q¯.
Case 3
For costs c below costs in the range cB, E(xj|pij = 1) = 0 and for costs c above
costs in the range cG, E(xj|pij = 1) = 1. Therefore for c 6∈ cG ∪ cB, j will never
change his investment decisions based on a message therefore pij = 0 for all i. 2
Proposition 2.2.2
Case 1
When c ∈ cG(tj), j will not invest unless he receives two good signals. Hence if
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messages are credible:
E(xj|pij = 1, sj = B, tj) = 0;
E(xj|pij = 1, sj = G, tj) = 1;
E(xj|pij = 0, tj) = 0.
Since ρGG(ti) = tiρGG and ρGB(ti) = tiρGB, the proof of proposition 2.2.1 follows
directly.
Case 2
When c ∈ cB(tj), j will not invest unless he receives at least one good signal.
Hence if messages are credible:
E(xj|pij = 1, sj = B, tj) = 1;
E(xj|pij = 1, sj = G, tj) = 1;
E(xj|pij = 0, sj = B, tj) = 0;
E(xj|pij = 0, sj = G, tj) = 1.
Since ρGB(ti) = tiρGB and ρBB(ti) = tiρBB, the proof of proposition 2.2.1 follows
directly.
Case 3
For costs c below costs in the range cB(tj), E(xj|pij = 1, tj) = 0 and for costs c
above costs in the range cG, E(xj|pij = 1, tj) = 1. Therefore for c 6∈ cG(tj) ∪ cB(tj),
j will never change his investment decisions based on a message therefore pij = 0 for
all i.2
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Chapter 3
The 1/d Law of Giving
This chapter is forthcoming in the American Economic Journal: Microeconomics and
represents joint work with Jacob Goeree, Leeat Yariv, Tiffany Tromp, and Tracy
Mitchell.
3.1 Introduction
The recent empirical literature has identified the importance of social networks in
diverse environments such as technology adoption, job search, and crime.1 Despite
the wealth of fascinating data there are several inherent problems that appear in the
empirical analysis of networks. First, the strategic interactions that underlie field
observations are usually hard to pinpoint. Second, the attributes of individual nodes
in the network tend to be restricted or missing altogether. Third, the endogeneity of
the network structure itself is difficult to account for. These problems draw a wedge
between the developing theory and the extant empirical work studying the impacts
of social structure on individual and collective outcomes.2 The current chapter con-
1E.g., Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay, and Imran Rasul (2009), Antoni Calvo-Armengol,
Eleonora Patacchini, and Yves Zenou (2009), Timothy Conley and Christopher Udry (2009), Ed-
ward Glaeser, Bruce Sacerdote, and Jose Scheinkman (1996), Mark Granovetter (1994), and Giorgio
Topa (2001).
2Recent theoretical works investigating strategic interactions on networks include Glaeser and
Scheinkman (2002), Andrea Galeotti, Sanjeev Goyal, Matthew Jackson, Fernando Vega-Redondo
and Leeat Yariv (2010), and Arun Sundararajan (2007).
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tributes a first step toward connecting social network structure and strategic behavior
by combining standard survey techniques with controlled experimentation.
We collected data from a unique population of 10 to 18 year old students in an
all-girls school in Pasadena, California. Our data set was assembled in two stages.
In the initial stage, we elicited the entire network of friendships, as well as a wide
range of personal characteristics of each of the girls, including height, race, confidence,
shyness, etc. In the second stage, we conducted an array of experimental dictator
games with fifth and sixth graders, varying the social distance between dictator and
recipient as determined by the length of the shortest path connecting them in their
(elicited) network of friends.
We chose this subject pool since we wanted to conduct experiments in a self-
contained network where peer effects are important. Indeed, the impact of social
networks on behavior can likely be discerned only when the information about the
network is accurate and complete, which requires high levels of participation by the
entire relevant population. Our design allows us to play the dictator experiments with
almost all students in the fifth and sixth grades. Because 95% of them completed the
social network survey we are able to account for the entire network structure when
analyzing giving behavior.3
Several insights come out of the analysis of our data. We find that dictator offers
are poorly explained by individual characteristics alone. The few characteristics that
are significant indicate that shy subjects give and receive less while popular subjects
(as measured by the number of subjects naming them as friends) give less but receive
more. We find no significant differences between kids in the fifth and sixth grades.4
3By playing the game in the field we are able to sidestep many of the selection problems identified
by Steven Levitt and John List (2006) and we control for some of the experimental “context” by
explicitly measuring the nature of the existing network that the games are played within.
4In important studies with children ranging in age between 7 and 18, William Harbaugh and Kate
Krause (2000) show that students who have been at the same school longer give more to classmates
and Harbaugh, Krause and Steven Liday (2003) find that older children make larger offers in dictator
and ultimatum games. These authors suggest that children internalize social norms during childhood.
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The model’s explanatory power dramatically improves once social distance is included:
the regressions reveal a simple inverse distance law of giving.
The second set of results pertains to the endogenous structure of the network itself.
Using a logit discrete choice model applied to the data from all grades, we assess what
affects each individual link’s creation, given the network in place (a notion reminiscent
of stability). We find that by and large links are significantly more likely between
students with similar attributes. This is consistent with the wide sociology literature
identifying homophily, the tendency of people to connect with those similar to them
(for a survey and references, see Miller McPherson, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and James
Cook, 2001). Hence, while personal characteristics do not directly affect strategic
outcomes, they may have an important indirect effect by determining the friends
one ultimately interacts with. We also uncover evidence for a form of preferential
attachment manifesting itself as a strong preference for cliques: students like to link
to those that are already “close.”
To summarize, our study serves as one of the first to identify the importance of the
underlying social network for dictator generosity. More generally, the combination
of survey techniques (to elicit student demographics and friendship networks) and
controlled experimentation allows for a careful measurement of network or peer effects
in strategic situations. As such, our approach should prove useful in evaluating some
of the recent theoretical work that investigates the interplay of social structure and
strategic play.
Furthermore, the analysis suggests a mechanism by which individual attributes
affect outcomes. Namely, attributes can help determine one’s neighborhood of friends
(i.e., the number of direct friends, friends of friends, etc.), which can in turn affect
outcomes.
Since their study does not include information about the children’s friends, they cannot determine
to what extent student behavior stems from generalized norms or from social preferences.
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Finally, this chapter relates to a strand of the anthropology literature investigating
giving behavior. Our findings suggest a possible alternative to the “culture” effects
observed in dictator games played with members of small scale societies around the
world (Joseph Henrich et al. 2001). It seems reasonable to assume that these small
scale societies differ in terms of the underlying network structure, in particular in
terms of average distances. Our results predict that in a more tightly-knit society,
more generous dictator offers can be expected.
3.1.1 Related Literature
There are several recent papers that connect experimental games with social net-
works. Specifically, Steve Leider, Markus Mobius, Tanya Rosenblat, and Quoc-Anh
Do (2009) pioneered the methodology of network elicitation followed by a controlled
altruism experiment. They obtained a social network of college students and illus-
trated that dictators give more to “friends,” i.e., recipients with social distance equal
to 1.5 Pablo Bran˜as-Garza, Miguel Dura´n, and Maria Espinosa (2005) replicate this
finding under weaker conditions: they compare giving behavior when dictators are
matched with one of their friends (not knowing which friend) or with a stranger.6
This alternative setup allows them to rule out the possibility that generous giving oc-
curs because the dictator knows the recipient’s identity and personal characteristics.7
Our study directly adds to this literature by looking at a very different subject
5Leider, Mobius, Rosenblat, and Do (2009) study several versions of the dictator game in which
they vary the amount received by the recipient when the dictator gives up part of the pie (see James
Andreoni and John Miller, 2002). Their main interest is to define and measure “social capital,”
defined as the extent to which subjects are able to internalize the externalities that arise from
dictator giving.
6The experiments were conducted during class and subjects were paid in terms of credit toward
their grades.
7Bran˜as-Garza, Ramon Cobo-Reyes, Natalia Jime´nez, and Giovanni Ponti (2006) report results
from a related setup in which dictators have some (known) chance of being matched with one of their
friends (not knowing which friend) or a stranger. In this case, dictator giving does not significantly
increase with the chance of being matched with a friend. The aforementioned studies are further
evaluated by Bran˜as-Garza and Espinosa (2005).
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pool that, in particular, allows us to analyze network effects across ages. Importantly,
our methods and results differ in several crucial ways. First, our evidence comes from
a self-contained social network. Compared to the previous studies our results show
a dramatic effect of social distance on dictator giving, possibly because the social
networks of 10 - 12 year olds are concentrated at their school (unlike, for example,
college students who may have some friends at home, at the place they work, etc.).
Second, besides eliciting data on friendships, we also gathered information about
individual students’ characteristics. This allows us to correct for the effects of the
recipient’s characteristics on the dictator’s offer (if any such effects exist). Third,
there are several elements of our design that mitigate or eliminate the possibility of
strategic reciprocity.8
Another related strand of literature pertains to the formation of social networks.
Denise Kandel (1978) followed adolescents over time and documented the interplay
between social connections and four behavioral attributes: frequency of current mar-
ijuana use, level of educational aspirations, political orientation, and participation in
minor delinquency. David Marmaros and Bruce Sacerdote (2006) illustrated that ge-
ographical and racial proximity are key determinants of friendships in a population of
students and recent graduates of Dartmouth. Similarly, Aldabert Mayer and Steven
Puller (2008) use Facebook data on Texas A & M college students and document that
proximity of major, dorm, and race are significant proxies for friendship formation.
These studies are consistent with the similarity-based connections that we observe
when eliciting a wide range of demographic and psychological characteristics across
different age groups. Interestingly, we also find evidence for a form of preferential
8Dictators were randomly matched with three of their friends, three friends of friends, and four
strangers. Dictators made ten allocation decisions in our design, one of which was randomly selected
by us to determine actual payments. Moreover, all subjects played the roles of dictators as well as
recipients simultaneously, which should balance out any claims for ex-post favors. Finally, subjects’
payments from being a dictator or a recipient were collected in envelopes, which they were supposed
to take home before opening them several days after the experiment.
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attachment that complements the tendency to connect to those who are similar, and
is in line with recent theoretical models of network formation (e.g., Albert-Laszlo
Barabasi and Reka Albert 1999, and Jackson and Brian Rogers 2007).
Our study also contributes to an ongoing debate regarding giving behavior in the
dictator “game,” where the typical outcome is that dictators give up non-negligible
amounts.9 “Dictator generosity” has inspired theories of other-regarding preferences
that incorporate notions of fairness into the standard utility-maximizing paradigm.10
Complementing these preference-based explanations, further experimentation has in-
vestigated the effects of “social context” on dictator giving. Elizabeth Hoffman,
Kevin McCabe, and Vernon Smith (1996) vary the instructions and administration
of the dictator game so that each variation makes the game a closer approximation
of standard social interactions. They find that lowering the degree of the dictator’s
anonymity results in more generous offers, and conjecture that a less-anonymous ex-
perimental design evokes levels of strategic reciprocity common to everyday repeated
social interactions. Iris Bohnet and Bruno Frey (1999), however, provide evidence
that dictator generosity is driven not by reciprocity but by the ability to identify
with the recipients, whether by knowing something about them or seeing their faces.
Likewise, Charness and Uri Gneezy (2008) show that recipients (located in a different
city) identified by their family names receive significantly larger amounts.11
These experiments are suggestive of the importance of “social distance” in explain-
ing dictator giving, where social distance is taken to be synonymous with anonymity.12
However, Martin Dufwenberg and Astrid Muren (2006) demonstrate that reducing
9See Gary Bolton, Elena Katok, and Rami Zwick (1998) for an overview of early dictator game
experiments, including Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch and Richard Thaler (1986) and Robert
Forsythe, Joel Horowitz, Savin, and Martin Sefton (1994).
10See, e.g., Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Axel Ockenfels (2000), and Gary
Charness and Matthew Rabin (2002).
11Deborah Small and Uri Simonsohn (2009) find that knowing a “victim” increases dictator giving
to another victim of the same misfortune.
12In the words of Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith (1996), social distance is “...a sense of coupling
between the dictator and her counterpart, or others who know the dictator’s decision.”
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anonymity, by paying dictators in public, lowers the amount given even when re-
cipients are visible or known to the dictator. Dufwenberg and Muren conclude that
“...it is problematic to organize experimental data in terms of social distance if this
notion is taken to vary one to one with anonymity.” In this chapter, we follow their
suggestion and instead formally define social distance as the geodesic distance in the
elicited network of friends.
3.1.2 Structure of the Paper
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the survey used to elicit the
network of friendships and students’ demographics and the protocol for the dictator
experiments. In section 3.3, we report regression results to explain observed dictator
offers. Section 3.4 analyzes the determinants of network formation, i.e., what causes a
link between two subjects to be formed. Section 3.5 reports simulation results showing
the effects of network position and individual characteristics on students’ welfare.
Section 3.6 concludes. Summary statistics of our data can be found in appendix A.
Appendix B contains the instructions, dictator decision sheet, and survey.
3.2 Design and Protocols
We collected data from students at an all-girls school in Pasadena, California. Our
design was comprised of two components. We first conducted a survey among all
students (grades 5 through 12) eliciting their network of friends and their personal
characteristics. Four months later, we conducted an array of dictator experiments
with girls from grades 5 and 6.
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3.2.1 Student Characteristics and Friendship Survey
The survey was conducted in January 2006. We approached teachers with the request
to give up 10 to 15 minutes of class time at the start of a class. Students were
instructed not to talk while filling out the survey nor glance at others’ responses.
One of us was present to monitor and to answer any questions about the survey. The
response rate in the entire population was 77%. In grades five and six, two out of
forty students were absent, so for this group the response rate was 95%.
The survey (see appendix B) consists of two parts: questions 1 - 11 concerning
individual characteristics and questions 12 - 14 concerning friendships. The former
include height, age, number of siblings, personality traits, and a few questions re-
garding physical appearance (e.g., hair and eye color and whether the student wears
braces). In the final three questions, students were asked to name up to five friends
and indicate how much time was spent with each. In addition, they were asked how
much time they spent with other friends (possibly from a different school) not ad-
dressed in questions 12 - 14 and how much time they spent doing extracurricular
activities (e.g., playing an instrument, sports, etc.).
The summary statistics for the entire population are contained in appendix A.
Here we list some relevant statistics for fifth and sixth graders that play a role in
our analysis of giving behavior below. The grades 5-6 subject pool is predominantly
Caucasian (51%), followed by Asian (27%), and Mixed (16%). The remaining 6% are
split between African-American, Middle-Eastern, and Hispanic. The average height
is 4’ 11” (ranging from 4’ 1” to 5’ 9”). Ages range from 10 to 12 years old (with
an average of 10.8); the number of siblings ranges from 1 to 4 (average 1.1); 30%
wear glasses and 40% wear braces. The questions concerning personality characteris-
tics show answers ranging from 1 (corresponding to the left-most bubble in question
11) to 5 (corresponding to the right-most bubble in question 11) with means of 2.9
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Figure 3.1. Network of fifth and sixth graders
Key: Nodes are sized according to degree and the different symbols indicate
race: Caucasian (red circle), Asian (blue triangle), Mixed (gray diamond), and
Other (green square). Thin (light grey) lines indicate one-way links, thick (dark
grey) lines indicate two-way links.
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(optimistic), 2.5 (extroverted), 2.4 (confident), and 2.3 (outgoing), respectively.13
Subjects reported anywhere from 2 to 5 friends (where 5 is the maximum by
design)14 with an average of 4.4. The resulting friendship network is displayed in
figure ??, where the nodes are sized by degree and the different symbols represent
race. The left cluster corresponds to grade 6, whereas the right cluster corresponds to
grade 5. A thin (light grey) directed arrow is drawn from subject i to j when i names
j as a friend but not vice versa, and a thick (dark grey) line is drawn when both i
and j name each other as a friend. The data from the time estimates (questions 13
and 14) are used in the simulation approach of section 3.5 to provide a measure of
how much time is spent with friends vis-a`-vis friends of friends.
3.2.2 Dictator Game Experiment
The experiments were conducted on April 20th, 2006. We ran the dictator games with
fifth and sixth graders during four separate classes, each of size 20. In each of these
classes the teacher would start by taking 10 subjects outside after which we would
read the instructions to the remaining ten subjects in the class (the instructions for
the dictator game are simple and standard, see appendix B). Subjects were allowed
to ask questions during the instructions phase and afterward. We then handed out
envelopes (labeled by name) that contained 10 decision sheets (see appendix B), each
sheet indicating the name of the dictator and that of the recipient.15 Each dictator
had to take a numbered decision sheet out of her envelope, record her allocation
13One possible concern about these psychological measures is that answers would cluster around a
focal answer. It is not the case that the majority of individuals chose the median answer. The per-
centages choosing the median answer of 3 were 38% (optimistic), 33% (extroverted), 35% (confident),
and 23% (outgoing).
14While the majority of subjects do report five friends, this constraint seems to have had little
effect on the substantive conclusions. All of the analysis reported in this chapter were repeated
on a sample restricted to those who reported less than five friends, yielding similar estimates and
conclusions. The results are available from the authors upon request.
15In other words, decision making is not anonymous: the dictator knows the identity of the
recipient but not vice versa. Of course, the recipient’s name had to be disclosed in order to capture
network effects.
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decision (i.e., how to split $6 between her and the recipient) and then take out the
next decision sheet. After all ten allocation decisions had been made the decision
sheets were put back in the envelopes.16 One of us would then roll a ten sided die
and mark the decision sheet to be used for actual payment. Once all ten dictators
were finished they were asked to join their teacher outside, at which point the other
ten subjects played the game. The allocated class time (one hour) proved more than
sufficient to run the games with two groups of ten dictators.
After the dictator game experiments were completed in all four classes, we took
the envelopes with us to determine actual payments. We returned the envelopes
the next day, which now contained only the subjects’ payments from the experiment
(total payment from all selected decisions in which the subject appeared in the role
of dictator or recipient) plus an additional $2 that served as a “show up fee.”17 All
subjects played the role of both dictator and recipient so it would be hard for a
dictator to extract favors from anyone that appeared on her list of recipients, since
the recipient could credibly claim to have already returned that favor. The subjects
received their envelopes a few days later and were instructed to bring these home
before opening them.
Of special interest is the matching protocol we used. To be able to discern the
effects of social distance on giving, we matched each dictator with three friends (dis-
tance 1), three friends-of-friends (distance 2), and four others (distance 3 or higher).
We borrowed this design element from the innovative study of Leider, Mobius, Rosen-
blat and Do (2009) who conducted dictator games and network surveys among college
undergraduates.
16This within-subject design enables us to more accurately measure the effects of social distance
on giving behavior and to generate enough data from the sample of fifth and sixth graders.
17This amount was suggested to ensure no subject had to feel her friends were not generous toward
her.
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3.3 Experimental Results
In this section, we describe the results derived from the experimental segment of our
design. Here, we take the elicited network of friendships as given. In section 3.4 below
we analyze the determinants of the network itself.
3.3.1 Explaining Giving Behavior by Individual Character-
istics
Average offers in our experiment were 34% (approximately $2 of the $6), which is
larger than standard results but comparable to average offers of 27% reported by
Charness and Gneezy (2003), where subjects make offers to a recipient identified by
family name.18 Furthermore, offers to strangers (defined as those of distance 3 or
greater) in our experiment were 18% on average, which is comparable to average
amounts reported in other dictator experiments. In our experiment, the game theo-
retic prediction of making no offers is seen in 36% of the offers to strangers, which is
consistent with numbers reported by Hoffman, McCabe and Smith (1996) for their
single-blind treatment.
We first analyze offer amounts using only individual characteristics collected from
our survey to explain the share of the pie ($6) given to the recipient. Height controls
for each individual’s deviation from the mean height, shy controls for individuals’
deviation from mean shyness, asian is a dummy equal to 1 if the participant’s race
is Asian, and popular proxies for a student’s popularity by counting the number of
people who call that student a friend. We also control for the recipient’s charac-
teristics: shy recipient represents the recipient’s deviation from the mean shyness,
popular recipient controls for the deviation of the recipient from the mean in-degree
18This difference has an intuitive explanation: Charness and Gneezy’s subjects were playing with
individuals in a different town, while our subjects know the recipients socially.
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measure, samerace is 1 if the dictator and recipient are of the same race and same-
height is 1 if both dictator and recipient are above or below the mean height. Sameconf
is 1 if both dictator and recipient are above or below the average on ranking how con-
fident they are. The results are summarized in table ??.19 Since each individual
makes 10 separate decisions, we report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that
take into account the cluster structure of the data.20
Of the demographic and network variables, only the survey measure assessing the
“shyness” of a subject is significant at the 5% level. Popular students (as measured
by their indegrees) receive slightly larger offers suggesting a “popularity premium.”21
Note that the individual and pair characteristics all represent relatively small effects.
Moreover, the explanatory power of the model is poor (R2 = .05).22
3.3.2 Explaining Giving Behavior by Individual and Network
Characteristics
To glean some insight into the importance of social distance on giving behavior we
computed the mean amount given for distances ranging from 1 to 10 (we pooled the
data for distances greater than 10 for which we have relatively fewer data points).23
The results are displayed in figure ??, where each of the 11 bars reflects the mean share
19Table ?? reports results from an OLS regression. We find qualitatively similar results from
an ordered probit regression: asian 0.248 (0.164), shy -0.157 (0.075), shy recipient -0.034 (0.042),
popular -0.051 (0.039), popular recipient 0.048 (0.020), samerace -0.058 (0.104), sameheight 0.002
(0.091), sameconf 0.100 (0.092).
20Similar estimates (not reported) were obtained using a random effects model. We also estimated
a fixed-effects model but could not reject the null hypothesis that the fixed-effects model and the
random-effects model were similar (using a Hausman test at the 5% significance level).
21If the dictator game proxies for a typical social interaction where giving is common, one possible
explanation is that shy students give less because they participate less in standard social interactions.
22We also considered the importance of individual demographic variables in giving, restricted to
offers made to friends only and offers made to strangers only. Even after this conditioning on social
distance, dictator and recipient demographics cannot explain offer amounts.
23Recall that we measure social distance as the minimum number of “steps” between any two
individuals in figure ??. A distance of 1 indicates (direct) friends, a distance of 2 indicates indirect
friends (friends of friends who are not direct friends), etc. When individuals are not connected by
the network their distance is coded 1001.
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Table 3.1. Explaining dictator offers by personal traits only (model 1) and by includ-
ing network variables (model 2).
Variable
Share of 6$
Model 1 Model 2
delta (δ) 0.356***
(0.040)
gamma (γ) -0.852***
(0.153)
order -0.047***
(0.009)
height -0.002 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
asian 0.057 0.039
(0.039) (0.040)
shy -0.037** -0.036**
(0.018) (0.018)
shy_recipient -0.010 -0.001
(0.01) (0.009)
popular -0.011 -0.017
(0.009) (0.012)
popular_recipient 0.010** -0.003
(0.005) (0.004)
samerace -0.014 -0.022
(0.024) (0.022)
sameheight 0.005 -0.006
(0.021) (0.018)
sameconf 0.028 0.006
(0.022) (0.019)
closeness -0.011
(0.009)
betweenness 0.003
(0.002)
power -0.002
(0.007)
Constant 0.324*** 0.156***
(0.020) (0.037)
Observations 629 629
R-squared 0.05 0.29
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Coefficient
(Standard Error)
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of the pie that was offered and the error bars indicate twice the standard deviation
(the theoretical black line is discussed below). Clearly, offers significantly decline with
distance.
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Figure 3.2. Observed and predicted offers by social distance
The effect of distance is captured in the regressions by including a term δdγ,
where γ < 0 reflects the decaying effect of social connection as distance increases. An
additional measure of social distance is captured by the variable order, which refers
to the order (1 - 5) a first-degree friend was listed (see question 12 of the survey in
appendix B). In the estimations, the variable order is coded as the deviation from the
mean. We also include three standard measures of network structure. Betweenness
measures the share of times an individual is between any two other individuals on a
path over all paths in the network, closeness is the sum of the inverse distance from i
to all other individuals in the network and power is a measure of the centrality of other
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individuals when i is removed from the network (see Phil Bonacich, 1987). For each of
these three network variables we take the deviation from the mean as the explanatory
variable. We take into account the panel structure, using a clustered design, and
report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The results are summarized in the
right-most column of table ??.
Shy is still significant, but remains small in size. The three social network structure
measures are not statistically significant and represent very weak effects. One possible
explanation is that for these measures to play a role, subjects would effectively need
to understand the entire network structure, which is unlikely the case in practice.
The social distance measures, in contrast, represent very large effects. The model
estimates that strangers, i.e., those of infinite distance, will receive 16% of the pie
while a second-degree friend receives an additional 20% and another 16% is added for
the median first-degree friend. Moving one deviation below the mean in the ordering
of friends is equivalent to losing 5% of the pie. None of the partner characteristics are
significant when we include controls for social distance. In particular, the effects of
the partner’s popularity vanish. Finally, note the dramatic improvement in fit once
social distance is included (R2 = .29).
The variation in offer amounts across different recipients is not driven by only a few
individuals. Most individuals showed substantial variation in offer amounts across the
recipients they faced. Only 5% of the individuals who participated in the experiment
offered the same amount to all recipients. We also consider the distribution of offers
conditional on social distance. Figure ?? shows that the distribution of offers for
recipients of distance 1 (friends), distance 2 (friends-of-friends), and those of distance
greater than 3 (strangers). Note that the offer distributions are ranked in the sense
of first-degree stochastic dominance, which illustrates that dictators make a clear
distinction between friends, friends-of-friends, and strangers.
Compared to other studies our results show a dramatic effect of social distance
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Figure 3.3. Empirical distributions by social distance.
on dictator giving, possibly because the social networks of 10 - 12 year olds are
concentrated at their school. Another reason could be that ingroup/outgroup effects
are much more pronounced among adolescents - relative differences between giving to
friends and others may be exaggerated at age 12. To summarize, introducing controls
for social distance significantly improves the fit of the model and introduces large
and significant effects, particularly in comparison with the individual and pair effects
reported above. The equation governing dictator giving in terms of social distance
may be neatly summarized as24
share given =
1
6
(
1 +
2
d
)
.
The predictions of this inverse distance law of giving are superimposed in figure ??.
24Note that the estimated parameters governing the social distance part are not significantly
different from 16 ,
1
3 , and 1 respectively.
67
3.4 Determinants of Network Formation
The previous section suggests the potential significance of the underlying social net-
work for individual outcomes. In fact, personal characteristics had far weaker predic-
tive power than network attributes in determining strategic behavior. Nonetheless,
personal characteristics may have an important (albeit indirect) role in determining
outcomes by affecting the social network at place, and thus the type, in terms of
social distance, of interactions an agent with certain characteristics experiences.
Our data allow us to measure the effects of individual characteristics on linking
choices. Furthermore, we observe links made by students from all grades (373 students
in total), not just grades 5 and 6. We analyze subjects’ linking choices with a logit
discrete choice model: for every link made by a subject we evaluate its “value” and
compare it to the values of other links the subject could have made (holding fixed
all other links in the network). This has the flavor of stability in the sense that if a
subject had a more valuable link available than one of her existing links, we would
expect her to shift social resources to that link and the network would not be stable.
Consider first a model where link values are determined by individual character-
istics alone. In particular, suppose a link from subject i to j has a value vij that is a
function of i’s and j’s characteristics vij = f(Xi, Xj). Then, using a logit model, the
probability that this link occurs is given by
Pij =
evij∑
k e
vik
. (3.1)
Estimating this model using a clustered structure to take into account that each indi-
vidual makes five independent decisions to link to a friend, we find that individual and
partner characteristics a role primarily when the characteristics of i and j match up,
see table ??.25 This is consistent with the extensive sociology literature on homophily,
25We restrict logit choices to students within the same grade, which captures almost all data. The
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a phenomenon referring to people’s apparent tendency to connect with others similar
to them (for an overview, see McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, J. M., 2001).26
The one individual characteristic that appears to affect the probability of linking is
the height of the network partner. Individuals are more likely to link to make friends
with girls who are taller.
There are network effects that seem intuitively appealing and do not appear in the
estimation of equation (3.1). Following the network formation literature on preferen-
tial attachment (see, e.g., Barabasi and Albert, 1999, and Jackson and Rogers, 2007,
and references therein), it is natural to entertain subjects’ preference to form cliques,
i.e., subjects’ preference to link to friends of friends. We model this by posing that
the probability that i links to j depends on the distance between i and j without the
link. Table ?? incorporates these network or distance effects into our logit model.27
For example, the dummy variable d2 is equal to 1 if, without the direct link between i
and j, there is already a path from i to j of length two. In other words, j is already a
friend of a friend and a direct link from i to j closes the “triad.” Finally, the dummy
variables d3 and d4 are 1 if, without the direct link from i to j there is already a path
from i to j of length 3 or 4 respectively.
As in the previous section, the inclusion of network variables results in a dramat-
ically improved fit (the log likelihood increases by roughly 1400 or 25%). Students
seem to have a strong preference to link to those that are already close. The result-
ing “cliques” are apparent from the network graph in figure ??. These observations
dummy variable sameboyfriend is 1 if the girls that form the link both have a boyfriend. Other
recipient characteristics we tried include confident, shy, boyfriend, Asian, height, braces, glasses, and
only child but none of them are significantly different from 0, and neither are sameshy, sameonlychild,
samebraces, sameglasses, sameoptimistic, and sameextroverted.
26There are several recent studies that explore the foundations and impacts of similarity-based
connections, e.g., Sergio Currarini, Jackson, and Paolo Pin (2009) and Mariagiovanna Baccara and
Yariv, 2008.
27There are potential endogeneity issues when incorporating these variables in the estimations.
Note, however, that the non-network estimates do not change significantly when the network vari-
ables are included, which provides evidence that the resulting estimates are not biased.
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Table 3.2. Explaining linking decisions by personal traits only (model 1) and by
including network variables (model 2).
Variable
Link
Model 1 Model 2
samerace 0.618*** 0.491***
(0.084) (0.084)
sameheight 0.263*** 0.289***
(0.064) (0.069)
sameconf 0.158** 0.158**
(0.066) (0.071)
sameboyfriend 0.683** 0.562**
(0.324) (0.225)
shy_recipient -0.019 0.030
(0.032) (0.035)
height_recipient 0.023** 0.010
(0.011) (0.013)
d 2 3.657***
(0.130)
d 3 0.940***
(0.169)
d 4 0.473***
(0.169)
Log Likelihood -5451.151 -4027.450
Links 1753 1753
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Coefficient
(Standard Error)
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are important when considering the distance of agents one chooses to interact with.
Indeed, girls in one’s clique are of short social distance. Our experimental results
suggest that dictator-like interactions with them are expected to yield high returns
relative to interactions with girls outside of the clique. Once we account for network
structure, the height of a partner is no longer a significant predictor of making a link.
In our data, height is weakly correlated with popularity (significant at 10%). Nicola
Persico, Andrew Postlewaite and Dan Silverman (2004) find that height affects early
childhood confidence, which could also suggest a tendency for taller individuals to
have more friends. This relationship between height and popularity may also explain
the fact that once we control for the network position of existing partners, height is
no longer an important predictor of making a link.28
The homophilic preferences underlying linking choices together with the depen-
dence of giving behavior on social distance identified in the previous section, suggest
the potential (indirect) significance of individual characteristics on outcomes. To il-
lustrate, note from figure ?? that Asian students tend to form cliques. Moreover,
table ?? shows that Asian students tend to give more (although the result is not sig-
nificant, possibly because of our matching protocol). If each girl interacts with a fixed
number of closest friends (or, alternatively, with all the girls that are of particular
distance from her) Asian students will, on average, receive higher benefits in dictator-
like settings. In other words, personal characteristics affect the type of agents one
28One natural question (raised by a referee) is “if similar characteristics determine network for-
mation (model 1 in table ??), and network positions determine giving (model 2 in table ??), then
why do we not see a big effect of individual characteristics on the amounts given (model 1 in table
??)?” For example, one could characterize a certain clique in the network by two characteristics,
i.e. a group of tall Asian girls. In this clique, girls are “close” and give a lot to each other, so the
interaction term sameheight × Asian could be expected to be a significant explanatory variable for
the amount given. Other cliques could be described similarly by constructing interaction terms that
involve two or more individual characteristics. We tried several models that included interaction
terms of this type, but found no improvement in fit. Basically, the interaction terms filter out few
subjects that satisfy multiple criteria, and our data set is not large enough to produce significant
effects. We do think that in a larger data set the network effects should be reproducible, although
less perfectly so, by considering individual characteristics.
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interacts with and, hence, social distances, which in turn affect earning outcomes.
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Figure 3.4. Simulated earnings by popularity.
Actual earnings in the experiment exhibit some variance, but our design of ran-
domly choosing one of ten decisions effectively dampens out network or demographic
effects. To gain more insight into the connection between network position, individ-
ual characteristics, and earnings, we simulate interaction over the entire network and
generate a normalized measure of the share of the $6 each individual is expected to
receive. In particular, first we predict offer amounts from i to j for all possible inter-
actions in the network using the results from estimating the inverse distance model
in section 3.2. Using survey responses, we next generate a weight that represents the
ratio of time spent on average with direct friends to the total time spent with all
friends. We then generate a weighted sum that represents the value any individual is
expected to receive from a pairwise interaction with any other member of the network
(we assume an individual is as likely to be a dictator as a recipient). We find that
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these simulated average earnings have a strong positive relationship with in-degree or
popularity, see figure ??.
Using the simulated earnings we are able to measure the importance of individual
and network characteristics, see table ??. First, note that without the inclusion of
network variables such as popularity, betweenness, closeness, and power, the model’s
predictive power is weak (left column). Including the network variables (right column)
improves the fit dramatically and predicts that the few most popular girls earn close
to four times as much as the least popular ones (see also figure ??). In particular,
each time a student is named by someone else as a friend, their in-degree goes up
by 1 and their normalized earnings by 2%. This raises the normalized earnings from
roughly 10% for someone who was never listed as a friend to 32% for someone who
was listed eleven times (the maximum in our sample), a more than three fold increase.
Note that the value of being listed as a friend by one extra person is roughly the
same as the value of being Asian. The underlying reason is quite different, however,
and ties back to the homophilic preferences discussed above. Asian girls tend to form
small cliques and they tend to give more on average - as a result the normalized
earnings of Asian girls are higher. This illustrates our earlier argument for why
individual traits (which do not explain the amount given) are important in explaining
subjects’ earnings - they affect linking choices and average distances, which are the
main determinants of giving behavior.
3.5 Conclusion
We collected survey data on friendship networks and individual characteristics from
the entire student body at an all-girls school in Pasadena, California. In addition, we
conducted several dictator games with 5th and 6th graders, varying social distances
between proposers and receivers (using the elicited social network structure).
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Table 3.3. Explaining earnings by personal traits only (model 1) and by including
network variables (model 2).
Variable
Simulated Received Earnings
Model 1 Model 2
height -0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
asian 0.026 0.025
(0.021) (0.019)
shy -0.016* -0.013
(0.009) (0.008)
confident 0.002 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007)
only child 0.012 0.006
(0.022) (0.022)
optimistic -0.001 -0.001
(0.007) (0.006)
braces 0.018 0.020
(0.016) (0.015)
glasses -0.029** -0.019
(0.014) (0.014)
popular 0.020***
(0.003)
between -0.003*
(0.001)
close 0.003
(0.002)
Power -0.000
(0.000)
Constant 0.200*** 0.122***
(0.009) (0.015)
Observations 330 330
R-squared 0.03 0.15
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Coefficient
(Standard Error)
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There are two main insights that shine through. First, network effects are ex-
tremely important in explaining dictator behavior, far more so than any individual
characteristic. In fact, the data reveal a simple 1/d law of giving, where d denotes
social distance between a proposer and receiver. Second, individual characteristics
are important in explaining the network formation process. We identify strong ho-
mophilous behavior in that girls tend to link to others similar to them.
These two insights suggest that social networks may constitute an important chan-
nel through which personal characteristics affect outcomes. Indeed, personal charac-
teristics may affect the agents one faces (say, the number of direct friends, friends of
friends, etc.) in a variety of strategic interactions. These, in turn, play a crucial role
in determining the resulting outcomes.
More generally, the study contributes to the rapidly expanding literature pointing
to the importance of social networks to economic consequences. It provides one of
the first to elicit both network and personal attributes and tie them to a controlled
strategic interaction.
The chapter also provides a contribution to the literature on social capital (see,
e.g., James Coleman, 1990, Robert Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti,
1992, Glaeser, David Laibson, and Sacerdote, 2002, and references therein). While
our population of subjects is very particular, in view of the social capital literature,
our results suggest that social network characteristics may serve as a useful proxy for
social capital (coarse network characteristics, such as joint memberships in organiza-
tions, have, in fact, already been used in some empirical work). In our setup, social
capital captured in that way have power in explaining outcomes, namely dictator giv-
ing. Furthermore, our results suggest that social capital formation may be impacted
by non-malleable physical characteristics. In particular, having an attribute that is
common in the population can ease the creation of close connections, since similar
individuals are easier to find, and consequently raise one’s potential for acquiring
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social capital.
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3.6 Appendix
Instructions: Welcome to this experiment! If you have any questions you may
ask . You are not allowed to talk with anyone except during the
experiment.
We will ask everyone from this class to make a series of 10 decisions. For each
decision, you get a separate sheet of paper (numbered 1 - 10) that lets you divide $6
between yourself and another student from this school: the name of the other student
is printed on the sheet. The other student might be someone in your class or someone
from a different grade. On each sheet you should write down how much you want to
keep for yourself and how much you want to give to the other student: any division
is allowed as long as the numbers add up to $6. When you are done, we will pick up
your sheet and give you a new sheet, which will have the name of a different student
printed on it.
Once you made all 10 decisions, we will roll a ten-sided die to decide which of
the 10 decision sheets to use. The amount you wrote down on this sheet to keep
for yourself is put in your “money envelope” and the amount you wrote down on
this sheet for the other student is put in the other student’s “money envelope.” No
student in your class (or in a different grade) will ever know their name was on your
sheet or how much money you gave to them.
After the experiment is done, each student will receive her own money envelope.
The amount of money in your envelope depends on how much you decided to keep for
yourself and how much others decided to give to you. The money in your envelope is
yours to keep and you do not have to tell anyone how much money you got.
Decision sheet (#1 out 10): Hello dictator’s name! Please choose how you want
to divide $6 between you and recipient’s name.
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Table 3.4. Summary statistics for the entire population (and grades 5 and 6).
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
grade 8.9 (5.5) 2.2 (0.5) 5 (5) 12 (6) 487 (80)
age 13.9 (10.9) 2.2 (0.7) 10 (10) 18 (12) 373 (76)
height 63.2 (58.8) 3.7 (3.4) 49 (49) 73 (69) 370 (75)
siblings 1.2 (1.1) 0.9 (0.8) 0 (1) 6 (4) 373 (76)
boyfriend 0.07 (0) 0.26 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0) 487 (76)
optimistic 3.0 (2.9) 1.0 (0.9) 1 (1) 5 (5) 368 (75)
extroverted 2.6 (2.5) 1.0 (1.0) 1 (1) 5 (5) 366 (75)
confident 2.7 (2.4) 1.0 (0.9) 1 (1) 5 (5) 368 (74)
outgoing 2.5 (2.3) 1.0 (1.0) 1 (1) 5 (4) 370 (74)
hours: friend 1 25.1 (25.0) 20.0 (17.4) 0 (1) 155 (64) 368 (75)
hours: friend 2 22.2 (21.7) 18.0 (15.6) 0 (1) 147 (56) 368 (75)
hours: friend 3 21.3 (21.0) 18.7 (15.5) 0 (1) 189 (50) 367 (74)
hours: friend 4 20.1 (19.6) 18.8 (15.4) 0 (0) 148 (50) 361 (69)
hours: friend 5 19.5 (21.0) 19.0 (16.1) 0 (0) 168 (56) 345 (63)
socializing 15.6 (12.8) 16.7 (15.7) 0 (0) 100 (80) 365 (72)
white 59.2% (50.7%) - - - 368 (75)
black 3.8% (2.7%) - - - 368 (75)
asian 22.6% (26.7%) - - - 368 (75)
mixed 9.5% (16.0%) - - - 368 (75)
hispanic 2.4% (2.7%) - - - 368 (75)
in-degree 3.6 (4.4) 2.1 (2.4) 0 (0) 11 (10) 487 (76)
Number of friends 4.8 (4.7) 0.6 (0.7) 1 (2) 5 (5) 370 (76)
Number of Surveys - - - - 373 (76)
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Survey
Thank you for participating in this survey. Please be assured that your answers will 
be kept completely confidential and your identity will be protected. While your 
name is required for this survey, we assure you that your identity will not be 
disclosed to any third parties nor published.
1. What is your first and last name: _______________________________ 
2. How old are you? ___________ 
3. What grade are you in? ____________ 
4. How would you describe your race/ethnicity? ________________________ 
5. How tall are you? __________ft  ___________in 
6. How many siblings do you have? ____________ 
7. What color are your eyes?  Please circle one:    
  Blue        Brown         Green        Hazel 
8.  What color is your hair?  Please circle one:   
 Brown        Blonde      Black        Red 
9. Do you currently wear braces? Please circle one:          Yes           No 
10. Do you currently wear glasses? Please circle one:          Yes           No 
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Chapter 4
No Excuses for Good Behavior
This chapter represents joint work with Sera Linardi.
4.1 Introduction
Economists have long been interested in the motivation behind prosocial behavior
such as volunteering or donating money. Andreoni (1989) proposes a model in which
individuals derive a “warm glow” from their contribution to others’ wellbeing. How-
ever, empirical evidence that people act differently when prosocial behavior is publicly
observable motivated theoretical models (Seabright 2004; Benabou and Tirole 2003,
2006; Ellingsen and Johannesson 1998) positing that individuals may also give in
order to improve their social image. A range of experimental evidence from Andreoni
and Petrie (2004), Rege and Telle (2004), Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (2007), and Car-
penter and Myers (2007) is consistent with models linking social image and prosocial
behavior.1
Nonprofits have long provided image rewards as a strategy to encourage contribu-
tion. The effect of an audience on monetary contributions has been studied,2 however
1Andreoni and Petrie (2004), Rege and Telle (2004) find that removing the anonymity of gifts
in a public goods game increases contributions. Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (2009) find that in a lab
experiment where keyboard clicks are translated to donations for charity, subjects click more when
they have to announce their donation to the room. Carpenter and Myers (2007) discover that having
a vanity license plate is positively correlated with volunteering as a firefighter.
2Andreoni and Petrie (2004), Rege and Telle (2004), Harbaugh (1998)
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these studies cannot be readily applied to labor contributions for three reasons. First,
labor consists of two dimensions: time and effort. Work on multitask agency problems
(Dewatripont, Jewitt, Tirole 2000) illustrates that rewarding one dimension of a task
can increase the emphasis on the rewarded dimension to the detriment of unrewarded
dimensions. For example, image rewards may encourage contribution of time, which
is readily visible, but harm productivity. Second, monetary contribution are often
studied in a static social environment, thus missing the dynamic changes of social
environment that can occur during contributions of labor. Third, the importance of
image rewards may depend on the degree of personal engagement in the social task.
Manipulations that are effective in encouraging monetary contributions may not be
effective in encouraging volunteering given the higher degree of personal involvement
inherent in labor contribution.
This chapter provides experimental evidence about two ubiquitous feature of the
volunteering environment: the availability of unverifiable excuses and the presence
of an organization’s representative. We use Benabou and Tirole’s (2006) binary par-
ticipation model as a starting point in predicting how stigma and visibility influence
contribution of time. We test three propositions. First, removing unverifiable excuses
increases average contributions. Second, volunteers are more likely to leave in clus-
ters when no excuses are available. Third, average contributions decrease without the
presence of an authority figure. We partner with the nonprofit School on Wheels to
design an experiment where the realism and context of volunteering can be integrated
into a setting with a precisely controlled social environment.
We find that removing excuses induces subjects to contribute more, but this effect
is weakened as soon as a single member of the group stops contributing. Second, we
find evidence that individuals leave in clusters only in the absence of excuses. Third,
removing the monitor does not reduce volunteering, in fact it slightly increases vol-
unteering but the effect is not robust. On the other hand, having a larger audience
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of peers (other subjects) increases the willingness to contribute, indicating that vol-
unteers may care more about the presence of peers than the presence of a monitor
(experimenter). Importantly, we find that our image manipulation does not affect
volunteers’ productivity. Social image manipulations generate a greater quantity of
contribution without affecting their average quality. Overall our findings suggest
that, while social image can be manipulated to increase prosocial behavior, the effect
is sensitive to the details of the environment.
Existing literature provides evidence that individuals exhibit behavior consistent
with stigma avoidance. Unconditional transfers in games (dictator game in Andreoni
and Bernheim 2009 and modified trust game in Tadelis 2008) are less generous when
players are able to obscure their decision behind a random mechanism. While the
stigma of making small transfers is static, we posit that in a group volunteering
situation the stigma of being the first person to quit is particularly high. To investi-
gate this, we discuss an alternative model where contribution are made dynamically
by individual decisions to quit in the current social environment. This alternative
model makes distinct predictions for behavior motivated by imitation and stigma
avoidance; if individuals are motivated by avoiding stigma, cascade behavior will be
less pronounced in the presence of excuses. On the other hand, behavior driven by
imitation will result in cascades regardless of whether excuses are available.
Nonprofits often send representatives to potential volunteers or donors, under
the assumption that the presence of an observer will make it more difficult for the
donor to reject the request to give.3 Two separate strands of literature examining
the effect of the presence of an authority figure give conflicting predictions. The
literature on crowding out from monitoring argues that the presence of a monitor
may be interpreted as distrust and could therefore decrease prosocial contributions
(Dickinson and Villeval 2008; Frank and Schultze 2002; Falk and Kosfeld 2004).
3DellaVigna, List and Malmendier (2009)
83
However, the experimenter demand effect literature posits that altruism seen in the
lab is motivated by subject’s desire to please an authority figure (the experimenter),
and hence subjects act more generously when the experimenter is present (Levitt and
List, 2006 and Zizzo 2009).4 We address the experimenter demand literature directly
by varying whether the experimenter is present.
Our work considers the possibility that the salient audience for the subjects is not
the experimenter but other subjects. Volunteers often perform their tasks not only
in the presence of a leader but also in the presence of other volunteers. Researchers
have often considered the social environment by using double-blind procedures, which
protect subjects decisions from both the experimenter and other subjects. As a result,
there is little evidence of the differential impact of experimenters and peers.5 Frank’s
(1998) finding that the decisions of experimental subjects in the lab are not sensitive
to the payoffs of the experimenter suggests that subjects are not concerned about
what the experimenter thinks of them. The chapter proceeds as follows. In section
4.2 we describe the theoretical background for our experimental treatments and make
predictions about what we expect to see in our experiment. In section 4.3 we describe
our experimental design and survey. section 4.4 presents the results. Section 4.5
concludes. Proofs for section 4.2 and experimental materials (instructions, software
screen shots, and survey questions) can be found in the appendix.
4.2 Theoretical Framework
In the typical charitable giving environment, a representative from an organization
solicits contribution from a group of individuals, each of whom may or may not be
4See Fleming, Townsend, Lowe and Ferguson (2007) and Paulhus (1991) for surveys of demand
effects in psychology.
5The introduction of a double blind protocol does not change the outcome of the voluntary
contribution game (Holt and Laury 1997) but it does for the dictator game (Hoffman, McCabe, and
Smith 1996).
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limited in their ability to contribute by unverifiable external circumstances. Using
Benabou and Tirole’s (2006) binary participation model (henceforth BT), we illustrate
the basic intuition of the image signaling mechanisms in this environment and derive
testable predictions. In the Appendix we show that the results of this binary model
extend to a decision of how much to contribute as subjects make when deciding how
much to volunteer.
BT relies on the assumption that individuals know not only of their own altruism
but also the distribution of altruism in the population. This information allows
them to solve for an equilibrium contribution level. In section 4.2.2 we provide an
alternative model where individuals do not know the distribution of altruism in the
population. The decision about how much to contribute is made in time as subjects
dynamically decide whether to continue working or not.
4.2.1 Equilibrium model of volunteering
Let v be an agents intrinsic motivation to volunteer. We model v as a random variable
with distribution function g(v) and an associated density function G(v).6 C be the
cost of volunteering, and x be the visibility of volunteering, which represent agent’s
awareness of being observed.
Let the decision to volunteer be represented by a = {0, 1}. An individual with
type v who faces a choice to volunteer with visibility x has the following utility for
volunteering:7
u(a = 1) = v − C + x(E(v|a = 1)− E(v|a = 0)) (4.1)
Individuals participate if v ≥ C − x(E(v|a = 1) − E(v|a = 0)) ≡ v∗ where the
6g′(v) decreasing implies that there are fewer highly altruistic types in the population than less
altruistic types.
7Note that u(a = 0) = 0.
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equilibrium threshold of altruism v∗ is implicitly defined by the equation
v∗ − C + x(E(v|v ≥ v∗)− E(v|v < v∗)) = 0. (4.2)
Let ∆(v∗|x) = x(M+(v∗) −M−(v∗)) be an agent’s image reward from partici-
pating, where M+(v∗) ≡ E(v|v ≥ v∗) is the honor for participating and M−(v∗) ≡
E(v|v < v∗) is the stigma of not participating.
Suppose with some probability δ ∈ [0, 1] individuals are prevented from volunteer-
ing by (unverifiable) external circumstances. It is straightforward to infer the type
of agents who participate, but more difficult to determine the type of agents who do
not. This is because there are two reasons that an agent might not participate: with
probability δ he has been prevented by circumstances, and with probability 1−δ he is
not altruistic enough to participate. The honor of participating remains unchanged,
but the stigma of not participating is now lessened:
M−(v∗|δ) ≡ δE(v) + (1− δ)G(v
∗)E(v|v < v∗)
δ + (1− δ)G(v∗) (4.3)
When g(v) is decreasing or constant in v, participation can be described by a
unique equilibrium threshold v. With this assumption on the population parameter,8
the binary model identifies two elements in the typical volunteering environment
that affect contributed time. First, the presence of the representative may increase
volunteering by increasing subjects’ awareness of being observed (x).9 Second, the
availability of excuses (δ) may have reduced volunteering by reducing the stigma of
not volunteering. We extend this binary participation model to discrete levels of
contributions in the Appendix and formally derive the two predictions below.
8Without this assumption (e.g when g(v) is decreasing or unimodal in v), then multiple equilibria
exists for a large range of C and g(v), making it difficult to derive theoretical predictions.
9In section 4.3.2 we ask if instead of the monitor, subjects signal their altruism towards their
peers.
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• Excuses Prediction: Removing excuses increases average time volunteered.
• Monitor Prediction: Reduced monitoring decreases average time volun-
teered.
4.2.2 Dynamic model of volunteering
Benabou and Tirole’s signaling model requires an individual to know the distribution
of altruism in the population. However, individuals may not know how altruistic they
are relative to other people but still be sensitive to what they think others perceive
them. Let ∆C(t) = C(t)−C(t−1) be the increase in cost from working an additional
minute at time t and x be the visibility of the volunteering activity. Individual i’s
utility for volunteering an extra minute is
Ui(t) = vi −∆C(t) + S(t|x, δ).
where S(t|x) is the image utility from the current social environment.
We posit that in a group volunteering setup there is a particular stigma attached
to being the least altruistic person in the group. Normalizing the honor of working an
additional minute to 1, an individual suffers disutility B > 1 if he is the first person
to stop working. The equation for image utility is therefore:
S(t|x, δ) = x(1− (−(1− δ)B)) if no one has left, x otherwise
A reduced awareness of being observed (x) in this dynamic model will reduce vol-
unteering as it does in the equilibrium model. Removing excuses (δ) will increase
volunteering, but will also introduce cascades of people leaving.
The existence of unverifiable external circumstances (δ) lowers volunteering in two
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ways. First, it lessens the bad apple stigma to (1−δ)B. Second, it introduces a prob-
ability that someone will be constrained by circumstances to be the first person to
leave, instead of leaving because of the bad apple stigma. When excuses are removed
(δ = 0), the bad apple stigma is fully present (B) before the least altruistic person
decides he will rather suffer B than work any more. Since there are more people
staying just to avoid the bad apple stigma when excuses are removed, cascades of
people leaving are more likely there than in a social environment where excuses are
available. This distinguishes a model of stigma avoidance from one of conformity,
where individuals have a simple preference for doing what others do10 and will there-
fore always leave in cascades, regardless of the availability of excuses. We will test
this prediction from the dynamic model in our experiment.
• Cascade Prediction: Cascades are more likely to happen when there are no
excuses.
4.3 Experiment
In order to test the predictions of theories of social environment, we need to precisely
isolate opportunities for social signaling. In the field, potential image benefits are
more difficult to isolate due to challenges in controlling or observing the visibility of
volunteering. In empirical studies, the preference to be seen as a good person may
be confounded with strategic image building such as bolstering a college application,
resume or career contacts. The lab offers no strategic image benefits and allows us
to isolate the social signaling audience to only observers present in the lab. Realism
and context are integrated into the lab by partnering with the nonprofit School On
Wheels (SOW) for orientation, training, and the choice of task.
10Goeree and Yariv (2006), Andreoni and Bernheim (2009)
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4.3.1 Experimental Design
Subjects received an email publicizing an opportunity to participate in an experiment
on decision making that did not mention volunteering. The experiment consisted of
two stages: training and volunteering.
The training session lasted 15-20 minutes. The experimenter started by intro-
ducing SOW and distributing SOW promotional materials.11 After all subjects in-
dicated they have adequate time to read the materials, the experimenter explained
the volunteering task. SOW has requested help in building a database of educational
resources. This task consists of doing internet searches and entering the information
into a database; up to seven entries (subject, website address, grade level, etc.) could
be made per resource. Each subject received a task sheet listing the areas in the
database assigned to them. Subjects were aware that they were all working on differ-
ent portions of the database and that their work would not be redundant.12 Subjects
then practiced the task by performing one directed internet search and one data en-
try task. After everyone had completed the training session, we announced they had
earned their show-up fee ($20) and were free to go; if they chose to, they could stay in
the lab and volunteer for SOW by performing the task they had just practiced for as
long as they like (up to 90 minutes). We clearly stated that no additional monetary
incentives would be forthcoming.
11Promotional materials included a People magazine article on SOW and a thank you letter from
SOW’s lead volunteer coordinator to the lab volunteers.
12The list contained several choices of grade levels and school subjects that has been randomly
drawn, adjusted to minimize overlap between subjects. Since the value of an individual’s database
entries is independent of other subjects’, concerns of free riding present in traditional public goods
experiment were likely minimal in this setting.
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4.3.2 Treatments
Baseline=Excuses+Monitored
Excuses: A random mechanism embedded in the database software provided subjects
with excuses to quit volunteering. Subjects clicked on a button on their screen to
‘roll a die’ after the training session. This die determined an individual’s maximum
time limit; a subject could stop at any point before the time limit but could not make
any further database entries afterwards.13 This random mechanism introduced the
probability δ of being prevented from working by external circumstances described in
section 4.2. Subjects were aware that each person could be limited by the randomly
determined maximum time but were unaware of the true probability distribution of
time limits. This approximates the natural occurrence of excuses where the true
distribution of obstacles to prosocial behavior is unknown; all that is known is that
E(δ) > 0.
In our experiment, δ = 0 with probability 2
3
, ensuring that a large share of the
data was generated from subjects who did not have excuses and could be compared
directly to subjects in the Remove Excuses treatment. In order for it to be credible
to subjects that there was a randomly generated stopping point, we set δ = 1 with
probability 1
6
, meaning that some subjects would be observed leaving the lab right
away. The remaining 1
6
of subjects received a time limit randomly chosen between 1
and 90. Neither the experimenter nor other subjects in the room know for certain if
a subject had stopped by choice or because of the random mechanism.
Monitored: The experimenter stays at the front of the room for the entire period
of volunteering and answers subjects’ questions in person.14
13We explained to subjects that this protected their anonymity.
14A lab technician was available to deal with computer problems if they arose.
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Remove Excuses: No Excuses + Monitored
In this treatment, the random mechanism was disabled. After training, subjects were
told that they could stay in the lab and volunteer for any amount of time they chose,
up to 90 minutes.
Remove Monitor: Excuses + Unmonitored
In this treatment, the experimenter left the room after training. In case questions
about lab protocol or the volunteering task arose throughout the experiment, subjects
could initiate contact with the experimenter through an anonymous chat software.
Subjects randomly selected chat IDs out of a paper cup, thus fully assuring that their
identity was protected from the monitor.15
Implementation
Pilot tests of the laboratory experiments took place at Claremont McKenna College
in 2007 and the full set of experiments was run at UCLA16 in Spring 2008 and Spring
2009.17 The full set of experiments were run as 13 separate sessions with a total
of 156 subjects. Each session has between 10 and 16 subjects. We ran 4 sessions
of Remove Excuses, 5 sessions of Baseline, and 4 sessions of Remove Monitor. The
average number of subjects per session in each treatment is 12. We consider two
outcome variables: the number of minutes worked by subjects and the number of
entries completed per minute.
Over the course of running the experiments, we completed a database of lesson
15Note that we do not implement a treatment with Excuses and Monitored. The theories we con-
sider here do not make predictions about the interaction between monitoring and excuses. Therefore
we focus on the effectiveness of each treatment in isolation.
16We attempted to replicate our experiment with actual SOW tutors, however logistical restrictions
resulted in inadequate participation.
17The experiments ran at Claremont include only a subset of the treatments discussed in the
chapter. The pilot results support our findings from the main experiments at UCLA and are available
from the authors upon request.
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plans before continuing on to educational activities.18 The task had to change once
the first task was completed to ensure that subjects’ volunteered efforts continue to
be useful for the organization. All data analysis controls for the task change.
We also collected data on demographic characteristics that have been found to
be important determinants of prosocial behavior.19 To control for past volunteering
experience, we ask subjects to report the length of time since their last volunteering
experience, the organization they worked with, and the rating they assign to that
experience. We also asked them to rate the value of the work done in the lab vol-
unteering task and to report whether they think volunteers should be paid for their
time. To control for the relevance of social connections or peer pressures, we asked
the subjects to report the number of people in the room they knew by name. The
data collection is conducted by an online survey; subjects are automatically directed
to that page when they click on a ‘Finish Volunteering’ button on the database soft-
ware.
4.4 Results
Of these 156 subjects in the experiment, 121 subjects were not affected by the random
mechanism, receiving a time limit of 90 minutes. We classify these subjects as unre-
stricted and treat them as our primary sample.20 We see a range of behavior in the
experiment, with some subjects leaving right away while others remain to volunteer
for nearly 90 minutes. The largest and most significant treatment effect comes from
a comparison of subjects in the Excuses and Remove Excuses treatments. Figure 4.1
18The complete database of the results of subjects’ volunteer work is available at
http://www.hss.caltech.edu/∼mmcconnell/data.xls
19Schady, 2001, Freeman, 1995, Mellstrom and Johannesson, 2005) for gender and (Brooks, 2006)
for religious activity
20Excluding subjects whose volunteering time was restricted does not introduce selection effects
since these subjects were randomly chosen by our random mechanism. For the dynamic model,
regression models with the full sample controlling for the restricted time limit are also included in
the appendix.
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presents a comparison of the empirical distributions of minutes volunteered. Table
4.1 shows the average minutes volunteered in each of the three treatment groups.
Table 4.1. Average minutes volunteered by treatment
Remove Excuses Baseline Remove Monitor
No Excuses Monitored Excuses Monitored Excuses Unmonitored
Average 38.76 20.02 26.97
Standard Error (3.06) (1.78) (2.19)
N 49 41 31
Only Subjects Unrestricted by Time Limit
Consistent with the Excuses Prediction, removing excuses increases the total
minutes volunteered. The difference between Remove Excuses and Baseline is positive
and statistically significant at the 1% level using a nonparametric Wilcoxon (Mann-
Whitney) test (z=4.26). Figure ?? illustrates that the distribution of minutes worked
in the Remove Excuses treatment stochastically dominates the distribution of min-
utes worked in the Baseline. This suggests that unrestricted volunteers contribute
more time in a social environment where contributions are not limited by external
circumstances.
The Monitoring Prediction was not supported by the data. A comparison of
Baseline and Remove Monitor shows that more volunteering happens in the absence
of the monitor. This difference is statistically significant at the 5% level (Mann-
Whitney test statistic of z = 2.41). Furthermore, the distribution of minutes worked
in the Remove Monitor treatment stochastically dominates the minutes worked in the
Baseline treatment. This suggests that observation by a monitor does not necessarily
increase prosocial behavior.21 (Mann-Whitney test statistic of z = 2.41)
Table 4.2 reports session level summary statistics for the 13 sessions for unre-
stricted subjects. We see a consistent pattern of higher average minutes worked in
21We do not make theoretical predictions about the effect of excuses relative to monitoring. How-
ever, using the Mann-Whitney test, we find that minutes worked under Remove Excuses is higher
than Remove Monitor at the 5% level (z=2.10).
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Figure 4.1. CDF of minutes volunteered
the Remove Excuses treatment. The Mann-Whitney test of the difference in average
minutes worked at the session level across Excuses and Remove Excuses treatments
yields a z-statistic of 1.389 which has a p-value of 0.08 for a one-sided test. We do
not see a consistent pattern of higher average minutes worked in the Remove Monitor
treatment when compared to the Monitored treatments (Mann-Whitney test statis-
tics z = 0.77). We conclude that the effect of removing excuses is robust to localized
social dynamics occurring at the level of the experimental session.
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Table 4.2. Session level statistics
Treatment Average Minutes Standard Deviation Min  Max
Unrestricted 
Individuals All Individuals
Average of Session 
Averages
18 13 1 39 6 12
18 9 9 35 10 13
31 9 18 44 6 11
22 14 1 46 10 13
15 7 1 23 9 12
21
26 21 0 52 5 10
28 11 11 42 7 12
29 13 13 47 10 13
25 7 15 36 9 11
27
53 14 32 74 10 10
23 15 4 53 16 16
67 6 60 81 10 10
25 5 15 35 13 13
42
All Summary Statistics refer to individuals unrestricted by time limit
Excuses Monitored
Excuses Unmonitored
No Excuses Monitored
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4.4.1 Consistency of Lab Behavior with Natural Volunteer-
ing Behavior
We perform several robustness checks to confirm that lab behavior is consistent with
volunteering behavior in a natural setting. First we verified that subjects were ac-
tually working during the experiment by examining each subject’s output. Figure
?? shows the relationship between the number of minutes worked and the entries
completed. The strong positive trend between minutes worked and entries completed
suggests that subjects were actually working instead of merely pretending to work.22
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Figure 4.2. Time volunteered and amount of work completed
We then examine the relationship between the number of minutes worked and
subjects’ self-reported valuation for the task. As we would expect, the higher subjects
rated the task, the longer they work (figure ??).23
22We also manually checked for evidence of internet searches or webpage visits unrelated to the
task at hand after subjects finished working. We saw only 4 - 5 cases where subjects were doing
work unrelated to the experiment.
23One concern is that some subjects who indicated that they had never volunteered before do
volunteer in the lab. After conversing with the subjects at the end of the experiment, we believe this
is due to the lower cost of volunteering in the lab. All the usual transactions costs for volunteering
such as searching for a cause to work for, learning the task, and traveling to the site has been
removed in our setting.
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Figure 4.3. Time volunteered and self-reported value of volunteering
In model 1 of table 4.3 we report results with covariates from least-squares regres-
sions examining the Excuses Prediction and the Monitoring Prediction.24 In
models 2, we included random effects for experimental sessions to allow for the pos-
sibility of group specific norms, or other correlation in behavior in each experiment.
The estimated coefficient on Remove Excuses suggests that removing excuses doubles
the time volunteered above the Baseline.25
In both models, demographic characteristics do not have predictive power in ex-
plaining time volunteered. Tests for the joint significance of all of the demographic
controls yields an F-statistic of 0.53 for model 1 and a χ2-statistic of 3.67 for model
2. While empirical studies suggest that demographic variables such as gender and
24One subject who finished volunteering early failed to complete the survey and we therefore
impute the values for their demographic characteristics. See regression without the covariates in the
Appendix.
25Subject in earlier experiments searched for worksheets (task1 ), while those in later experiments
searched for educational activities. We estimated a separate intercept for subjects working on
worksheets, task1, which is negative and statistically significant. This may be because subjects may
have found searching for activities less tedious than searching for worksheets and therefore were
more willing to spend time on activities. The results of separately estimating the treatments on the
task 1 and task 2 data are qualitatively similar.
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Table 4.3. Main treatment effects
Least Squares 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Entries Entries/Min
(Intercept) 21.975*** 21.907*** 33.461*** 1.393***
(4.066) (7.172) (11.715) (0.230)
Remove Excuses 19.959*** 22.124** 36.465** 0.195
(4.216) (10.240) (14.409) (0.248)
Remove Monitor 7.724** 6.815 1.152 ‐0.309
(3.218) (10.280) (14.656) (0.256)
Task 1 ‐5.26 ‐4.231 18.655 0.805***
(3.551) (8.826) (12.465) (0.215)
Random Effects (by experiment) ‐ YES YES YES
ρ ‐ 0.612*** 0.190*** 0.058
Breusch Pagan LM statistic ‐ (185.97) (15.46) (0.45)
Covariates:
Male ‐2.622 ‐2.48 ‐12.232* ‐0.105
(3.065) (2.190) (6.652) (0.158)
Religious 0.432 2.062 ‐1.479 ‐0.044
(3.163) (2.247) (6.823) (0.162)
Recent Volunteer 1.716 1.454 3.045 0.013
(3.103) (2.154) (6.589) (0.157)
Know other subjects ‐2.783 ‐2.814 3.533 0.250
(3.145) (2.793) (8.561) (0.205)
N 121 121 121 121
Test Statistic 4.880 8.740 17.850 22.830
P‐Value 0.000 0.272 0.013 0.002
Test F‐Test Wald test Wald Wald
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
Subset of subjects whose volunteering was unrestricted by random time limit
,
Random Effects
Minutes Worked
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religion are correlated with volunteering activity, they are not a central determinant
of behavior in our experiments.26
4.4.2 Alternative Explanations
So far we have interpreted the findings that unrestricted subjects work more in the
Remove Excuses treatment as evidence that subjects work less when the stigma of
not working is alleviated by unverifiable excuses. We now consider several alternative
explanations. First, subjects with higher time limits in the Excuses treatment may
have worked less because they were motivated by a conditional cooperation motive
and were willing to work only while others were working. In other words, it may
be that introducing a random time limit from our experiments changed subjects’
interpretation of the social correct contribution. We made efforts to ensure that
the language across the treatments is identical in the instructions (provided in the
Appendix). In each treatment, subjects are told that they can stop volunteering
whenever they like regardless of their assigned time limit. The random mechanism is
explained as a way of ensuring subjects’ privacy and not linked in any way to what
subjects should do.27
It may also be that subjects perceive different time limits to be unfair and might
be less willing to work if they perceived that they were being asked to work more
than others. In order to consider the possibility of this fairness motive, we check for
negative correlation between the random maximum time limit of the 35 restricted
subjects and the actual minutes worked. Figure ?? illustrates that higher time limits
26Demographic trends in our experiment follow field evidence to a certain extent. For exam-
ple, many studies have shown that women volunteer more than men – the negative coefficient of
Male suggests that this may be true in our population. We also see further evidence of a negative
relationship between males and volunteering in our duration model analysis presented in section
4.4.4.
27It may also be that the random time limit served served as an anchor that influenced subjects’
behavior mechanically. However, the fact subjects were responsive to the behavior of others and the
size of the audience, suggests that our treatment did successfully alter the social environment (and
that anchoring was not the main factor in determining the treatment’s effectiveness).
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did not induce lower volunteered time (the 45 degree line is provided as a point of
comparison).28 Instead, we see that that subjects work more when their work time
is less restricted. This result is consistent with nonprofits insistence on ‘the power of
the ask,’29 or the idea that people will give more if asked.
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Figure 4.4. Time restriction and time volunteered grouped in 5 minute intervals
Another possibility is that the maximum time limits lowered volunteering by in-
creasing subjects’ attention to the value of their time. However, we find no evidence in
the survey that subjects in the Excuses treatment are equally likely to favor compen-
sation for volunteers in their situation as subjects in the Remove Excuses treatment.30
We would expect subjects to consider volunteering time to have a different value in
the Excuses treatment if it called their attention to the value of their time.
28One subject stayed in the lab even though he was assigned a 0 time limit and therefore falls
above the 45 degree line.
29Giving and Volunteering in the United States 2001, The Independent Sector; Andreoni (2006);
Andreoni and Payne (2003)
30The Mann-Whitney test statistic for the comparison is z = 0.11.
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4.4.3 Quantity and Quality of Contribution: Time and Pro-
ductivity
We now consider the effect of the image treatments on ‘quality’ of work, the invisible
dimension of volunteer’s contribution. In model 3, we consider the total number of
data entries completed, while in model 4 we consider productivity (the number of
entries per minute). Results considering the total number of data entries completed
is consistent with results when we consider the number of minutes worked.
When we consider productivity, the coefficient on Remove Excuses is close to zero
and not significant, as we would expect with an invisible dimension of volunteer work.
While not significant, the coefficient on Remove Monitor is negative, suggesting that
while we see more time volunteered in the unmonitored sessions, the time volunteered
may be slightly less productive. We conclude that while removing excuses has a
powerful impact on increasing volunteering time, it does not decrease the quality of
work (productivity).31
4.4.4 Duration Model: Volunteers Response to Changes in
Social Environment
We now more carefully examine how volunteers respond to their dynamically changing
social environment. We first consider predictions from the bad apple model. In
order to consider the possibility that subjects consider the decision to stop working
differently when they are the first person to leave, we consider the relationship between
the number of people who have left and the average number of minutes until someone
else leaves in figure ??. The figure illustrates an overall positive relationship between
31Unlike our estimation of treatment effect on visible output, we do not see any evidence of
statistically significant random effects at the level of the experiment using a Breusch Pagan test
(test statistic=0.45). Norms or dynamics at the level of the experimental session play a role only
when behavior is visible.
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the number of subjects who have left and the time until the next subject leaves.
However, subjects wait much longer to leave when no one else in the room has left.
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Figure 4.5. Relationship between the order of leaving and clustering
We also consider the bad apple norm within the framework of the duration model.
Specifically, we examine whether anyone else had left in the preceding time interval
and the number of individuals leaving in the current period. We then consider the
possibility that the salient audience is the number of remaining peers at the start of
the time interval.
For our discrete time model, we consider time in five minute intervals.32 In table
4.4 we consider the subsample of 121 unrestricted individuals.33 Model 1 estimates the
32Since it takes less than five minutes to complete a unit of the volunteering task, intervals larger
than five minutes would be too large to capture the effect of changes in the social environment on
decisions. The results are robust to smaller intervals of time.
33The full sample of 156 individuals is presented in appendix table 4.5 where we added an addi-
102
baseline discrete time duration model when no time varying social image variables are
included. In any time interval, subjects are 24% more likely to continue volunteering
when excuses are removed and 10% more likely to continue working when not observed
by a monitor. We see the willingness to work decline over time: with every additional
five minutes, subjects probability of continuing to work decreases by 6%.
4.4.4.1 Evidence – Bad Apple Stigma
In our alternative model of volunteering (section 4.2.2) subjects, uninformed about the
distribution of altruism in their population, are unable to solve for the equilibrium
time contribution and instead decide whether to continue volunteering or not on
the basis of the current social environment. We focus in particular on the stigma
of stopping work before everyone else, which we refer to as the bad apple stigma.
This stigma cause a buildup of subjects who would like to leave the room but are
uncomfortable doing so unless someone else leaves first. In this model, the action of
someone stopping will lead to a cluster of people leaving. The availability of excuses
reduces this stigma, thus making the fact that nobody has stopped less relevant and
reducing the buildup of volunteers waiting to leave.
Model 2 of table 4.4 estimates the probability that a person continues to volunteer
in a particular time interval given AnyoneLeft, a binary variable that is 1 if someone
has left the room. AnyoneLeft by itself is negative but not significant, however, its
interaction with RemoveExcuses is negative and significant which is consistent with
the Cascade Prediction. Subjects are more likely to leave after the first person left
when there are no excuses available.
In model 3 we estimate the probability that subjects continue working when a
cluster of other individuals leaves within that time period. We find that the Number
tional control for the number of time periods remaining in each individuals’ maximum time limit.
All conclusions hold qualitatively.
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Table 4.4. Discrete time model for unrestricted subjects
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Probability of working 0.161 0.178 0.157 0.194
dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx
Variable
Remove Excuses 0.244*** 0.417*** 0.337*** 0.178**
(0.062) (0.117) (0.071) (0.079)
Remove Monitor 0.108** 0.008 0.105** 0.080
(0.045) (0.063) (0.049) (0.086)
Period #  ‐0.057*** ‐0.058*** ‐0.058*** ‐0.027***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Task1 ‐0.072** ‐0.065* ‐0.072** ‐0.063
(0.033) (0.034) (0.031) (0.037)
Remaining periods before 
time limit
Time varying social factors
Anyone left in prior periods ‐ ‐0.121 ‐ ‐
‐ (0.077) ‐ ‐
Anyone left in prior periods  ‐ ‐0.165** ‐ ‐
x No Excuses ‐ (0.057) ‐ ‐
Anyone left in prior periods  ‐ 0.117 ‐ ‐
x Unmonitored ‐ (0.087) ‐ ‐
# subjects leaving in period ‐ ‐ 0.009 ‐
‐ ‐ (0.008) ‐
# subjects leaving x No Excuses ‐ ‐ ‐0.052*** ‐
‐ ‐ (0.014) ‐
# subjects leaving x Unmonitored ‐ ‐ 0.006 ‐
‐ ‐ (0.012) ‐
# subjects remaining in period ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.053***
‐ ‐ ‐ (0.010)
# subjects remaining x No Excuses ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.012
‐ ‐ ‐ (0.009)
# subjects remaining x Unmonitored ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.005
‐ ‐ ‐ (0.009)
Demographic controls
Male ‐0.051* ‐0.069** ‐0.048 ‐0.086**
(0.030) (0.032) (0.029) (0.037)
Religious 0.011 0.025 0.010 0.041
(0.031) (0.033) (0.030) (0.040)
Recent Volunteer 0.016 0.037 0.018 0.023
(0.031) (0.033) (0.030) (0.038)
Know other subjects ‐0.013 ‐0.023 ‐0.012 ‐0.002
(0.031) (0.036) (0.030) (0.042)
AIC 0.584 0.539 0.515 0.538
N 2299 2299 2299 2299
Standard errors are clustered by individuals
Marginal effects after glm (Bernoulli distribution with complimentary log‐log link function)
Periods are defined in  minute intervals (0, 1‐5, 6‐10)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Subset of Subjects who faced no time restriction
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of Subjects Leaving does not have a significant effect on the probability of leaving,
but its interaction with RemoveExcuses is negative and significant. The presence
of the monitor has little effect on both models. We find that when excuses are not
available, subjects are 16.5% more likely to leave when someone else has left and 5%
more likely to leave for every subject that leaves within that time period. The fact
that we do not observe a significant effect of the number of other individuals in the
room when excuses are present suggests that subjects are not merely imitating each
other’s behavior and is consistent with our model of bad apple stigma avoidance.
RemoveExcuses increases the probability that individuals continue to volunteer
by 42% even after attempts to estimate the bad apple stigma. While the bad apple
norm is important, we estimate that only one third of the treatment effect of remov-
ing excuses derives from the reluctance to be the first person to leave. The utility
of continuing to work seems to be higher throughout the experiment when external
circumstance cannot be blamed for stopping work. Similarly, Remove Excuses con-
tinues to have a powerful effects on behavior after taking cascades of subjects leaving
into account, increasing the probability of volunteering by 27% - 34%.
4.4.4.2 Evidence on Audience Effects
So far, following the experimenter demand effects literature and the emphasis of
practical literature on the presence of volunteer leadership, we have focused on an
authority figure as the salient audience for image signaling. Our experimental results
on removing the monitor are surprising: we see evidence weakly suggestive of crowd-
ing out from monitoring. Motivated by findings from Falk and Ichino (2006) where
individuals are more willing to work more when working alongside others, we consider
the possibility that the salient audience for image signaling are fellow volunteers. A
peer group may provide individuals with camaraderie (Rotemberg, 1994) or in the
case of image signaling, higher image benefits from a larger audience.
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In model 4 of table 4.4, we estimate the effect of the number of peers present
at the beginning of the period on the probability of continuing to volunteer in that
period. We see evidence consistent with the hypothesis that subjects are signaling
their altruism to peers, not to the monitor. An additional peer observer present
during the period will increase the probability of continuing to work by 4% - 5% and
there is no differential effect of Remove Excuses or Remove Monitor. The coefficient
on RemoveMonitor is consistently positive (though not always significant), suggesting
that being observed by an authority figure has the opposite effect from being observed
by a large peer group.34 One implication of this finding is that it is important to
carefully identify the potential audience to gauge the effectiveness of internventions
designed to manipulation social image. In particular, nonprofits may want to look at
the effect of members of a volunteer group on each other in addition to the effect of
a volunteer leader on the group.
This suggests that the RemoveExcuses treatment works in part because it main-
tains a larger peer group, since the random mechanism limits the amount of time
that some of the subjects can stay in the room. However, we find that even after
controlling for the number of subjects in the room, subjects are 20% more likely to
continue working in each time interval in RemoveExcuses.
4.5 Conclusion
Recent theoretical and empirical studies have shown that image concerns play a cen-
tral role in prosocial behavior. However, while a large body of literature addresses
financial contributions, only a small literature exists on contributions of time and
34This is consistent with crowding out from monitoring; an audience of peers does not communicate
distrust, thus increasing image concerns without crowding out intrinsic motivation. An alternative
interpretation is that the pleasure from additional peers comes from additional intrinsic motivation
and hence does not affect image signaling.
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effort.35 We focus on volunteering, a prosocial activity performed by a quarter of
Americans on a weekly basis (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2006).36
Our experiments attempt to unpack various components of the social environment,
with a focus on social visibility and stigma. We provide experimental evidence on the
effectiveness of two important features of the social environment common to many
volunteering settings: 1) the availability of excuses for not volunteering and 2) the
presence of a monitor. We consider predictions from a model of image signaling
behavior as well as a dynamic model where individuals respond to features of the
social environment.
Working closely with the nonprofit School on Wheels, we test these theoretical
predictions with an experiment that translates the core components of institutional
volunteering into a carefully controlled laboratory setting. By using the nonprofit’s
own promotional material and volunteering task, we engage student subjects directly
in the social mission of the nonprofit. The lab setting allows us to control recruit-
ment, task training, and more importantly, the observability of volunteers’ actions and
availability of excuses while precisely measuring both time and effort contributed.
Subjects contributed substantial time and effort in our experiment, producing
several large databases of internet resources. Providing subjects with an excuse to
leave early reduced the average minutes worked by half. Our experimental evidence
also shows that prosocial behavior is slightly lower when a monitor (the experimenter)
is present.
Our evidence suggests that subjects’ response to the social environment is com-
plex. First, the identity of the observer matters: while a larger audience of peers
makes individuals more likely to volunteer, the presence of a monitor can be coun-
35Some examples of studies of financial contribution include Karlan and List (2007), Landry et al
(2006) and Shang and Croson (2009). Studies in labor contribution include Gneezy and Rustichini
(2000), Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (2009), Carpenter and Myers (2007)
36Hodgkinson and Weitzman (1994) report that in 1990, Americans gave $100 billion in funds,
and an estimated $182.3 billion worth of volunteer labor.
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terproductive. Second, when we consider the dynamic context of volunteering more
closely, we see that subjects are highly sensitive to many different features of the
environment. On the one hand we see behavior consistent with a dynamic response
to social norms – in the absence of excuses, subjects are more likely to leave after
someone else has left and more likely to leave when others are leaving.37 However,
even when we estimate subjects’ response to components of the social environment
such as whether anyone has left, the clusters of people leaving, or the number of
subjects left in the room, the availability of excuses remains an important predictor
of the willingness to continue volunteering.
Volunteers’ productivity was unaffected by changes in the availability of excuses.
Image treatments targeting the observable component of the contribution (time) do
not affect the unobservable component of the contribution (productivity). This sug-
gests a dual purpose of prosocial behavior as both an expression of intrinsic altruism
and as a way of publicly signaling this altruism.
Our results have implications for interventions aimed encouraging prosocial be-
havior. Restricting the ability of potential volunteers to give excuses can increase
the amount of time volunteered without impacting the quality of work. Therefore
common nonprofit practices, such as asking for contributions of time or money in
public (i.e., church collection plates), or precommiting contributions (such as pledges
or organizing work retreats) are likely to be effective. However the success of elim-
inating excuses may be reduced by the presence of a single bad apple who openly
refuses to contribute. In other words, while social image can be manipulated to in-
crease prosocial behavior, the level of success is sensitive to the details of the social
environment.
37The fact that we see this heightened sensitive only in the absence of excuses makes it less likely
that this behavior represents pure conformity.
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4.6 Appendix
Proofs for section 4.2
∆(v∗|δ, x) is increasing in v∗. Let [vL, vH ] ∈ R+ indicates the interval where v is
drawn from. By Proposition 6 (Benabou and Tirole, 2006), the assumption that g(v)
is decreasing implies that ∆(v∗|δ, x) is increasing in v∗ when δ = 0. Since M+ is
unaffected by δ, we only need to show that the slope of M− when δ > 0 lies beneath
the slope of E(v|v < v∗).
Let f(v) ≡ E(v|v < v∗) and f ′(v) be its derivative. Let fH ≡ E(v|v < vH) = E(v).
Also define e(v∗) ≡ δ + (1 − δ)G(v∗) and h(v∗) ≡ (1−δ)G(v∗)
e(v∗) . Rewrite M
−(v∗|δ) =
δ fHe(v
∗)−1 + g(v∗)f(v∗) and take its derivative:
∂M−(v∗|δ)
∂v
= − δfH
e(v∗)2
+ h′(v∗)f(v∗) + h(v∗)f ′(v∗). (4.4)
Taking the derivate of h(v∗) and substituting with e(v∗) we get
h′(v∗) =
(1− δ)G′(v∗)e(v∗)− (1− δ)G(v∗)e′(v∗)
e(v∗)2
=
(1− δ)G′(v∗)δ
e(v∗)2
. (4.5)
Substituting equation (??) into equation (??) and simplifying, we are left to show
that
δ(1− δ)G′(v∗)f(v∗)− δfH
e(v∗)2
< f ′(v∗)(1− h(v∗)).
Since 0 < h(v∗) < 1 and f ′(v∗) > 0, f ′(v∗)(1 − h(v∗)) > 0. Since by assumption
g′(v∗) < 0, (1− δ)G′(v∗)f(v∗) < fH , which implies that the slope of M−(v∗|δ > 0) is
smaller than M−(v∗|δ = 0). Hence ∆(v∗|δ > 0, x) must be increasing in v∗.2
Let a¯(δ, x) ≡ N(1−G(v∗)) denote the total participation among a population of
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N individuals. Removing excuses increases total participation.
0 = δ < δ′ ⇒ a¯(δ, x) > a¯(δ′, x).
Let v′ the solution to v + ∆(v|δ′, x)−C = 0. Honor remains unchanged by excuses
while stigma is lowered, hence ∆(v|δ′, x) < ∆(v|δ, x). When excuses become unavail-
able v′ + ∆(v′|δ, x) − C > 0, which implies v′ will still participate. By lemma ??
we know that ∆(v∗|δ, x) increases in v∗, hence the new cutoff type v∗ whom is now
indifferent about volunteering must be a lower type. Since participation is decreasing
in type, v∗ < v′ implies higher total participation when δ = 0.
Reduced monitoring decreases participation.
0 < x < x′ ⇒ a¯(δ, x) < a¯(δ, x′)
Let v′ the solution to v + ∆(v|δ, x′) − C = 0. When visibility is decreased, v′ +
∆(v′|δ, x′)−C < 0 hence type v′ will no longer participate. By lemma ?? we know that
∆(v∗|δ, x) increases in v∗, hence the new cutoff cannot be smaller than v′. Hence v∗ >
v′, and since participation is decreasing in type, this implies lower total participation.
We now extend this binary participation model to our volunteering setup. Suppose
there are t level of contribution: participate 1 minute, 2 minutes, up to a maximum
of T minutes. Let C(t) be the cost function for contribution level t where C ′(t) ≥ 1
(cost does not decrease in time). Let v∗t be the threshold type for participation level
t. Individuals contribute at level t if
u(t) = vt− C(t) + ∆(v∗t |δ, x) ≥ 0.
Treating each individual as facing t binary participation decision, let v∗ = (v∗1, .., v
∗
t , .., v
∗
T )
be the equilibrium threshold types induced by environment (δ, x). We can show that
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higher levels of participation induce strictly higher thresholds than lower levels of
participation; in other words individuals who do not choose to volunteer in level t
will also not participate in level t′ where t′ > t. The monotonicity of v∗t allows total
time volunteered to be computed in intervals. This allows us to extend lemma ??
and lemma ?? to t levels of contribution.
Level t threshold type v∗t is strictly higher than level t − 1 threshold type v∗t−1.
The utility of the cutoff type at each level is zero:
v∗t t− C(t) + ∆(v∗t |δ, x) = v∗t−1(t− 1)− C(t− 1) + ∆(v∗t−1|δ, x) = 0.
Note that v∗t =
C(t)−∆(v∗t |δ,x)
t
. Subtracting the utilities we get
(v∗t − v∗t−1)(t− 1) + v∗t − (C(t)− C(t− 1)) + ∆(v∗t |δ, x)−∆(v∗t−1|δ, x) = 0. (4.6)
Substituting v∗t into equation (??) and simplifying we arrive at
(v∗t − v∗t−1)(t− 1) + ∆(v∗t |δ, x)−∆(v∗t−1|δ, x) =
∆(v∗t |δ, x)
t
+ C(t)− C(t− 1)− C(t)
t
.
From the assumption that C ′(t) ≥ 1, C(t) − C(t − 1) − C(t)
t
≥ 0. Since ∆(v∗t |δ,x)
t
> 0
the entire right hand expression is positive. By lemma ?? we know that ∆(v∗|δ, x)
increases in v∗, hence v∗t cannot be smaller than v
∗
t−1 < 0 since this implies ∆(v
∗
t ) −
∆(v∗t−1) < 0 and that the left hand expression is negative. Hence v
∗
t > v
∗
t−1.2
In a volunteering setup involving T levels of participation we can make the fol-
lowing two predictions.
• Excuses Prediction: Removing excuses increases time volunteered.
0 = δ < δ′ ⇒ a¯T (δ, x) > a¯T (δ′, x).
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• Monitoring Prediction: Reduced monitoring decreases time volunteered.
0 < x < x′ ⇒ a¯T (δ, x) < a¯T (δ, x′).
Let v′ = (v′1, . . . , v
′
t, . . . , v
′
T ) denotes the vector of cutoff types induced by environment
(δ′, x) while v∗ = (v∗1, . . . , v
∗
t , . . . , v
∗
T ) denotes the vector of cutoff types induced by
environment (δ, x). Hence v′t is the solution to vtt + ∆(vt|δ′, x) − Ct = 0 while vt
solves vtt+ ∆(vt|δ, x)−Ct = 0. Following the proof of the binary case lemma ?? we
arrive at v∗t < v
′
t. Letting N be the total number of agents in the population, total
time volunteered is
a¯T (δ, x) ≡ N
T−1∑
t=1
t(G(v∗t+1)−G(v∗t )).
This implies that a¯T (δ, x) > a¯T (δ
′, x). Using same steps and application of lemma ??
we show that a¯T (δ, x) < a¯T (δ, x
′) for 0 < x < x′.2
Removing excuses increase volunteering but makes cascades more likely.
0 < x < x′ ⇒ a¯(δ, x) < a¯(δ, x′).
Cascade Prediction Let {v1, v2, . . . , vN} represent the altruism of a group of
N volunteers, listed in increasing order. Utility of volunteering an extra minute is
Ui(t) = vi−∆C(t) + S(t|x) where S(t|x) = x(1− (−(1− δ)B)) if no one has left and
x otherwise. Let t∗i be the solution to vi − ∆C(t) = 0, person i’s optimal stopping
time without the bad apple stigma. The least altruistic individual, unaware that he
is of the lowest type v1, will continue working past t
∗
1 up to time tˆ1 which solves
v1 − ∆C(t) + x(1 + (1 − δ)B) = 0. At tˆ1, he will leave (and suffer B) to prevent
negative utility. This first act of leaving immediately removes B as a constraint to
the individual optimization problem of the remaining individuals.
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Depending on the distribution of altruism, this can induce a “cascade”: all people
of type vi whose optimal stopping time has passed t
∗
i < tˆ1 would now also leave.
Unverifiable external circumstances (δ) lowers volunteering in two ways. First, it
lessens the bad apple stigma to (1 − δ)B. Second, it introduces a probability that
a person of type vj > v1 is forced to leave at an earlier time than tˆ1 (v1’s stopping
time), thus completely eliminating the bad apple stigma early on. Cascades of people
leaving are less likely in a social environment where excuses are available than one
where no excuses are available since fewer people are staying to avoid the bad apple
stigma.2
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Table 4.5. Discrete time model for all subjects
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Probability of working 0.128 0.141 0.125 0.156
dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx
Variable
Remove Excuses 0.197*** 0.381** 0.273*** 0.139*
(0.058) (0.119) (0.070) (0.079)
Remove Monitor 0.079** 0.025 0.068* 0.057
(0.022) (0.045) (0.037) (0.071)
Period #  ‐0.036*** ‐0.036*** ‐0.038*** ‐0.010*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Task1 ‐0.045* ‐0.039 ‐0.045* ‐0.031
(0.025) (0.027) (0.024) (0.029)
Remaining periods before  0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.015***
time limit (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Time varying social factors
Anyone left in prior periods ‐ ‐0.027* ‐ ‐
‐ (0.042) ‐ ‐
Anyone left in prior periods  ‐ ‐0.127*** ‐ ‐
x No Excuses ‐ (0.035) ‐ ‐
Anyone left in prior periods  ‐ 0.018 ‐ ‐
x Unmonitored ‐ (0.047) ‐ ‐
# subjects leaving in period ‐ ‐ ‐0.001 ‐
‐ ‐ (0.007) ‐
# subjects leaving x No Excuses ‐ ‐ ‐0.036** ‐
‐ ‐ (0.011) ‐
# subjects leaving x Unmonitored ‐ ‐ 0.009 ‐
‐ ‐ (0.010) ‐
# subjects remaining in period ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.039***
‐ ‐ ‐ (0.008)
# subjects remaining x No Excuses ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.003
‐ ‐ ‐ (0.007)
# subjects remaining x Unmonitored ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.003
‐ ‐ ‐ (0.007)
Demographic controls
Male ‐0.032 ‐0.041* ‐0.030 ‐0.054*
(0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.029)
Religious 0.009 0.018 0.009 0.032
(0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.030)
Recent Volunteer 0.003 0.015 0.004 0.004
(0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.029)
Know other subjects ‐0.008 ‐0.015 ‐0.008 ‐0.031
(0.024) (0.028) (0.024) (0.029)
AIC 0.607 0.547 0.516 0.541
N 2964 2964 2964 2964
Standard errors are clustered by individuals
Marginal effects after glm (Bernoulli distribution with complimentary log‐log link function)
Periods are defined in  minute intervals (0, 1‐5, 6‐10)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Master Subject Instructions  
 
1. Thank you for coming. During this experiment, please do not talk, or use the web for any activities 
outside of the experiment.  If you have any questions please raise your hand and an experimenter will 
come to you to answer it in private.  This experiment is different from other experiments you may 
have participated in because we will be actually be working with a local nonprofit. Today’s session 
will consist of a 15 minute training session, for which you will earn $10 and another $10 showup fee.  
After the training session, you may stay and volunteer unpaid as long as you like up to 90 minutes.  
 
After volunteering, you will complete a brief survey.   
 
Random Mech: (No Experimenter in parenthesis) 
This experiment is completely anonymous, not only to other subjects but also to the 
experimenter (who will not be present during the experiment).   Your decisions and answers 
to the survey will be tagged by only an ID number, allowing us to analyze the data without 
using any identifying personal information.   
 
(Again, it is important that you do not communicate with each other. After the training 
session, the experimenter will have no further involvement with anyone in this experiment.  
However, you may ask questions to the experimenter throughout today’s session using the 
AIMExpress. You have received a piece of paper with a username and password for the chat 
software.  The experimenter will be on your buddy list when you sign in. If you have any 
problems signing in, raise your hand and a lab assistant will help you.)  
 
2. On your keyboard there is information about School On Wheels, the nonprofit that we will be 
working with today. Please read the article about the organization. Our job today is to compile a 
database of educational activities for School on Wheels tutors. These tutors often do not have 
teaching background and may find it difficult to come up with age appropriate activity for kids that 
can be done with their limited resources. The list of activities you suggest today will help the tutors 
connect with homeless kids more effectively.   
 
3. I will now pass along a sheet of paper on the type of activity that you are in charge of finding. We 
have staggered your task for minimum overlap with other students so that we get to cover as many 
areas as possible. Please take a look at your task and ask me any questions you have. 
 
4. Before we start the actual work, we will do a five minute practice task. Click Start Practice Task. You 
are now in the database window. Please take extra care to not close this screen during the ENTIRE 
experiment.  
 
5. Random Mech:  
 
Notice that in the bottom of the screen there’s a button that says “Roll Dice”. 
You will click this LATER when you have completed your practice task. This mechanism 
protect the privacy of your choice of how long to volunteer. When you click Roll Dice, the 
computer will roll a dice and randomly pick the maximum number of minutes you will 
volunteer today. This number will be between 0-90 minutes and the computer will 
automatically stop you from starting a new entry once time is up. It will not interrupt you so 
do not worry about losing any work. Remember: you can stop at any point before this time 
(there will be a button that says Finish Volunteering). You do not have to do the number 
of minutes the computer picked: how long you want to work is completely up to you. Again, 
your privacy is guaranteed: when you leave the room, nobody will know whether you chose 
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to finish or were forced to by the time limit. Before you leave, please complete the survey. 
After rolling the dice, if your time limit is zero, click Start Survey. Any questions?  
 
6.  Please press Ctrl T to open a new tab, look online for an art project using recycled materials, and 
input the information you found into the database window. When you are finished with your practice 
task please wait for further instructions before you click on anything.  
7.  
Public: 
 
You can click Start Volunteering now. Now you will look for the activity listed in your sheet. 
Remember that you choose how much you want to work, the maximum is 90 minutes. If you 
chose to stay to volunteer, it is very important that you work carefully, since the information you 
produce today be given out to tutors as a searchable database of educational activities.  Please 
keep the database window open and fill the survey before you go. 
 
DB:   
You can click on Roll Dice now and start the real volunteering task. Now you can look for any 
activity that is listed in your sheet.  If you chose to stay to volunteer, it is very important that you 
work carefully, since the information you produce today be given out to tutors as a searchable 
database of educational activities.  Please remember to keep the database window open and fill 
the survey before you go. 
 (I will now leave the room. To reach me at any time you can ask me through AimExpress. 
Please open the AimExpress, and send thx.experimenter a test message. If you have any 
software problems, raise your hand and a lab assistant will help you.)   
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Educational Activity Resource
Database
Help us build a database of targeted educational activities to help tutors engage their students.
Please work carefully. If you cannot find the information from the webpage, please write "N/A".
Click Next to proceed to the next entry. Click Finish Volunteering if you have completely finished
working.
Your practice task today is to find instructions for an art activity using recycled materials.
Please open another tab (Ctrl T) to perform searches and use this screen to enter information. Do
not close this screen.
Use this practice session as an opportunity to ask any questions you have.
1. Subject:
2. Grade level:
3. Description/topic area (algebra, history, painting, etc):
4. Website address:
5. Approximate duration of time needed to complete (please estimate):
6. Description of online resource or the activity itself (worksheet, field trip, experiment, etc):
7. (Optional) What is interesting about this resource? What advice do you have for the tutor
who chooses to do this activity with his/her student? Does it require special
preparation/skills?
http://corinth.hss.caltech.edu/slinardi/volInc2/databaseP.cgi
1 of 2 6/1/2009 6:07 PM
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Chapter 5
Moral Framing and Contributions
to Public Goods
This chapter represents joint work with Jacob Goeree and Antonio Rangel.
5.1 Introduction
A wide array of theory and empirical evidence1 suggests that explaining charitable
giving is not as simple as determining whether individual preferences include altruism
toward others or individual benefits from the provision of public goods. In particular,
recent research has considered a variety of ways in which the context of a charitable
contribution may affect the willingness to give. Benabou and Tirole (2006) provide
a theoretical model demonstrating that when individuals are concerned about their
social image, greater social visibility and opportunities for social signaling make in-
dividuals more willing to give. Fong and Luttmer (2009) show evidence that the
demonstrated worthiness of the recipient of charity makes larger gifts more likely.
While this evidence suggests that many features of the context of a gift may
affect the willingness to give, we propose a different notion of how context may affect
charitable contributions. Both the evidence surrounding charitable giving and the
strategies of nonprofits suggest that individuals might give partly because they feel
1Andreoni and Miller 2002; Charness and Rabin 2002
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some moral responsibility to give.
Consider for example an individual who is approached by Oxfam and asked to
donate $25 to help alleviate the effect of famine on children in Africa. Many well-fed
individuals living a comfortable life feel some moral responsibility to contribute when
children are starving and when the cost to themselves is relatively small. However, if
an individual had recently made a $25 gift to an appeal to end children’s hunger from
another organization, the feeling of moral responsibility might be diminished when
asked to donate again and they might decline to contribute more. The difference in
the success of an appeal for a contribution in these two situations cannot be explained
by a difference in the worthiness in the recipient or any change in the visibility of
individual generosity to others. Nonetheless, it is apparent that the context of the
gift, specifically the sense of moral responsibility influence the propensity to give.
A look into the fundraising efforts of nonprofits suggests that they are aware that
a sense of moral responsibility is an important determinant of individual willingness
to give and that they attempt to frame the decision to contribute in these terms.
Charities appeal to these motives in two ways: 1) they frequently provide individuals
with a suggested contribution levels and 2) they often make an outright appeal to
morality and responsibility. In figure ??, we provide examples of charities using
language that frames the contribution decision in a moral way: in each of the examples
we provide individuals are asked to “do your part.”
The goal of this chapter is to provide evidence on how morally induced giving
is modulated by the two methods of fundraising described in the previous para-
graph. Our experimental design allows us to separate the effect of simply providing
a suggested contribution from the effect of providing a suggested contribution that is
framed as a morally responsible choice. We find evidence that providing a suggested
contribution increases the average gift and the share of individuals making a gift
at the suggested level. Furthermore, we find that framing a suggested contribution
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Figure 5.1. Examples of “do your part” language from nonprofits
Key: From left to right: (A) An email from the Obama presidential campaign (B) South-
west Florida Water Management District (C) National Parks Conservation Association (D)
Do Your Part Recycling Co (E) A newspaper article from the Christian Post and (F) A
fundraising request from a children’s cancer society.
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as a moral responsibility further increases the provision of the public good and the
likelihood of making a gift at the suggested level.
Literature Review
A comprehensive theoretical literature has proposed a model of charitable giving in
which individual giving may not be motivated by simple (pure) altruism, but also
from the simple good feeling one gets from giving: “warm glow.” Andreoni (1989)
proposes a model in which individuals receive utility from their gift, regardless of
whether the public good is provided. Experimental evidence from Crumpler and
Grossman (2008) and Null (2009) confirms that individuals make contributions even
when there would be no incentive to do so if individuals were purely altruistic (when
their own contributions perfectly crowd out public giving). Theoretical and empirical
evidence from Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) also illustrates little evidence from crowd
out of charitable giving, suggesting a large share of motivation for giving comes from
warm glow motivations. The theory of warm glow giving is supported by evidence
from neuroeconomics Harbaugh et al. (2007) suggests that individuals exhibit neural
activity consistent with reward processing when they make a voluntary contribution.
We do not argue that morally motivated giving is inconsistent with giving for warm
glow. In fact, we propose that the two can coexist. However, it is difficult to explain
the success of language that frames the problem in terms of moral responsibility if
individuals care only about the size of their own gift.
Andreoni (1995) presents evidence that may be consistent with a sense of moral
responsibility, showing that individuals are more likely to make contributions to sup-
port goods with positive externalities than to reduce equivalent negative externalities.
Our work is related to evidence from Andreoni (1995) that the cold prickle felt from
behavior that is ungenerous is not symmetric to the warm glow felt from being gener-
ous. The evidence presented here is consistent with Andreoni’s proposed asymmetry
121
between individual reactions to positive and negative deviations from a reference
point. In this chapter, we argue that endogenous preferences are modulated by “ex-
ogenous” factors such as institutions. We consider how each component of a fundrais-
ing strategy that provides individuals with a suggested contribution and frames that
contribution as a moral reference point adds to the success of the fundraising strategy.
A major component of consulting work for charitable organizations consists of
determining optimal “ask strings” or suggested donations.2 Andreoni and Payne
(2003) model the effectiveness of “the ask” as a latent demand for contributions to
public good. Dale and Morgan (2009) provide a dynamic model of charitable giving
where high levels of contributions can be supported in a voluntary contribution game
as individuals learn over time about the types of other subjects, thereby providing
the information necessary to support a fairness equilibrium. They find support for
the theory from experiments in which individuals give more when provided with a
suggested contribution amount. They illustrate that their results are consistent with
predictions of Rabin’s (1993) fairness model. Experimental evidence from Marks,
Schansberg and Croson (1999) and Croson and Marks (2001) suggests that providing
individuals with a suggested donation level increases individual contributions and the
provision of public goods. Our chapter takes these models a step further by proposing
that the success of the suggested contribution stems in part from a sense of moral
responsibility, and that these moral motivations can be further activated through
simple framing language.
Our work is also related to the theoretical work by Duncan (2004), in which
individuals gain utility based on the impact their contribution makes on a social
problem. This model differs from a model of warm glow in that individuals care not
just about their contribution, but also about whether their contribution “makes a
difference.” Duncan’s model differs from a traditional model of warm glow because in
2Andreoni (2006)
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contrast to warm glow, individuals may see no change in their impact utility as their
contribution increases if the provision of the public good does not increase as well.
In contrast, for the kind of moral motivation we propose, individuals care about the
relative morality of their gift choice and not about the outcomes produced. While
we demonstrate that framing language may change the relative costs and benefits of
adhering to a moral reference point, Duncan’s model of impact philanthropy would
not predict that framing language would have any affect on contributions.
The role of emotions which we focus on here has been examined in prior work.
Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) find a strong relationship between the willingness to
pay for public goods and independent reports of the moral satisfaction of contributions
to those public goods. Biel et al. (2006) provide experimental and survey evidence
that the discrepancy between willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept
(WTA) can be explained by greater shame from not contributing to a public good
when asked in the context of WTA than WTP. Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2009) examine
how behavior in cooperative games responds to different kinds of philosophical appeals
with and without the ability to punish deviators. We examine whether moral emotions
can be manipulated by a simple institutional mechanism. By isolating the effect of
providing a suggested contribution from the additional impact of the moral framing
language, we are able to narrowly identify the effect of moral framing.
5.2 Experimental Design
In order to test the hypothesis that giving is partially motivated by wanting to adhere
to some moral standard we design a public goods experiment with three treatments.
In our experimental treatments, we test a) the simple effect of establishing a suggested
contribution and b) whether framing language can change individuals’ response to the
suggested contribution. Our experimental treatments are modeled after a common
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strategy used by nonprofits, the combination of a suggested contribution with lan-
guage to “do your part.” With our treatments we isolate the effect of the suggested
contribution effect from the additional effect of the framing language.
5.2.1 Experimental Predictions
Employing the idea of morally motivated giving, we develop hypotheses regarding the
average contributions and the share of individuals giving at the suggested contribu-
tion level in our experimental treatments. Our first prediction concerns comparative
statics for each of these metrics when we introduce a suggested contribution. We
predict that instituting a suggested contribution will have the following effects:
• Average contributions will increase when individuals are provided with a sug-
gested contribution.
• The number of individuals who make the suggested contribution will be higher
when there is a suggested contribution.
We next consider what will occur when a suggested contribution is presented
with moral framing. When the suggested contribution is framed in terms of moral
responsibility, we predict that:
• Average contributions will increase when the suggested contribution is morally
framed.
• The number of individuals who make the suggested contribution will be higher
when the suggested contribution is morally framed.
5.2.2 Parameters of Public Good Experiment
The contribution decision made by individuals takes place in a simple threshold public
goods game. Individuals had private values for the public good, which we will rep-
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resent by vi. In the experiment, individual values were uniformly and independently
distributed over the range [150, 210]. Individuals were a member of a group of size
3, 6 or 12. Individuals received their private value only if the threshold contribution
level was reached by the group and the public good was produced. If the threshold
contribution level was not reached, individual contributions were not refunded. In
each period of the experiment, every individual received an endowment of
∑
vi
N
where
N was the number of people in the group. Individuals chose how much of their endow-
ment to contribute. The threshold of contributions required for the public good to
be provided was 0.6
∑
vi. Since the threshold is below the sum of values, provision of
the public good is socially efficient. Subjects were told that endowments, thresholds
and values were drawn from a fixed distribution. The full instructions are provided
in the appendix.
In the Suggested Contribution (SC) and Moral Frame (MF) treatments, we gen-
erated a suggested contribution amount that was a percentage of individuals’ private
values from providing the public good. The suggested contribution was 70 percent of
an individual’s value (vi) in that round. It was not a symmetric equilibrium strategy
for all individuals to make a contribution at the suggested level. If individuals were to
all provide contributions at the suggested level, the total contributions for the group
would have reached 0.7
∑
vi. At this level of contributions, it would have been indi-
vidually rational for subjects to have reduced their contribution. An individual could
have reduced their contribution by up to 0.1
∑
vi and the public good would still have
been provided. Therefore it is clear that contributing at the suggested contribution
level cannot be an equilibrium strategy if strategies are symmetric.
5.2.3 Information
The distribution of individual values in the experiment was common knowledge. Indi-
viduals were told that endowments and thresholds were drawn from a fixed distribu-
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tion. In each period, individuals were told their endowment, their group’s threshold,
their value from providing the public good and the number of people in their group.3
5.2.4 Framing Language
In addition to information related to the public goods game, individuals in some treat-
ments were provided with a suggested contribution. In order to determine whether
framing language was able to change individual reaction to a suggested contribution
we designed three treatments.
Control (C) In the control group, individuals were not provided with any suggested
contribution.
Suggested Contribution (SC) In the suggested contribution treatment, individu-
als were provided with the suggested contribution which was called a “suggested
investment.”
Moral Frame (MF) In the moral frame treatment, individuals were provided with
the suggested contribution which they are told was the “Amount required to
DO YOUR PART.”
Figure 5.2 shows the screen seen by subjects in all three treatments.
5.2.5 Implementation
Individuals played 30 rounds of the public goods game. They received no feedback
about the outcome in each period. Only one of the periods was randomly selected for
3After each round of the experiment, subjects answered a question intended to measure satisfac-
tion. Subjects were asked “On a scale of 1-10 with 1 being the least satisfied and 10 being the most
satisfied, how satisfied would you be if this is the round that gets implemented?” after their decision
in each round. Because subjects received no feedback about the outcome of the game in each round,
this self-reported satisfaction depended on their own choice only and not on the outcome of the
game.
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B              C 
 
  
Figure 5.2. Screenshots used in the different experimental conditions.
Key: (A) Control treatment. (B) Suggested Contribution. (C) Moral Frame.
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payment. Subjects were not informed which round would be implemented until the
end of the experiment. Subjects received 10 cents for every point they received in the
experiment. The first 10 rounds were played with 3 person groups; the next 10 rounds
were played with 6 person groups and the final 10 rounds were played with 12 person
groups. In each experimental session there were 12 individuals. The experiments
were run at UCLA in 16 sessions with a total of 192 subjects. The implementation
of the sessions is summarized in table 5.1. Total payments (including a $5 show-up
fee) averaged $13 and ranged from a minimum of $1 to a maximum of $44.
Table 5.1. Experimental sessions
Treatment # of Sessions # of Subjects
Control 5 60
Suggested Contribution 6 72
Moral Frame 5 60
5.3 Experimental Results
We consider the following results from our experiment: the effect of the treatments on
individual giving and the treatments’ effects on public good provision and efficiency
for the group.
5.3.1 Treatment Effects on Individual Giving
To consider the effect of the treatments on individual contributions, we consider a
measure of giving as the share of the suggested contribution. Figure ??A illustrates
the distribution of contributions across the three treatments. As predicted, we see a
significant increase in the share of individuals giving the suggested value comparing
the Control treatment and the Suggested Contribution treatment. Similarly, we see
a further increase in the share of individuals giving the suggested contribution from
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the Suggested Contribution and Moral Frame treatments. In addition, the share
of individuals making no contributions is more than twice as high in the Control
treatment compared with the Suggested Contribution or Moral Frame treatments.
We then examine the average amount given by treatment (again considering the
share of the suggestion contributed) in figure ??C. Average giving in the Moral Frame
treatment, 91% of suggestion, is statistically significantly higher than the average for
the suggested contribution treatment, 88% of suggestion (the comparison of means
t-test has a p-value=0.01). Both the Moral Frame treatment and the suggested contri-
bution treatment are significant improvements on average contribution in the control
group average of 73% of the suggestion (both t-test comparisons have p-values< 0.01).
Therefore, it would appear that a large share of the increase in contribution based on
the strategy of providing a morally framed contribution level comes from simply es-
tablishing the moral reference point. Nonetheless, framing the decision with explicitly
moral language does provide additional increases in contributions.
In order to further examine individual decisions about whether to contribute,
we consider four ranges of relevant behavior: the decision not to contribute, the
decision to contribute less than the suggestion, contributions at the suggestion level
and contributions over the suggested level. Specifically, we consider the average share
of individuals who fall into the following definitions: those who gave between 0%
and 10% of the suggested amount (Gave Nothing), those who gave between 10%
and 90% of the suggested amount (Gave Some), those who gave between 90% and
110% of the suggested amount (Gave Suggestion) and those who gave more than
110% of the suggested amount (Gave More). Figure ??B illustrates that the share
of individuals giving the suggested amount (Gave Suggestion) is significant higher
in the Suggested Contribution than the Control treatment (p-value for the t-test is
< 0.01). Furthermore, there is a significant increase in the share giving the suggested
amount with the moral framing treatment in the MF treatment (p-value for the t-test
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Figure 5.3. Treatment effects on individual giving
Key: (A) Histogram of donations by condition measured as the share of the suggestion
contributed. (B) Fraction of individuals who gave less than the 10% of the suggested amount,
10%-90% of the suggested amount, 90%-110% of the suggested amount, or more than 110% of
the suggested amount. (C) Average contributions by treatment. (D) Average contributions
by group size. Error bars denote SEMs.
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is < 0.01).
Figure ??B also shows that individuals in the Moral Frame treatment were less
likely to give some but not enough to meet the suggestion, (p-value for the t-test is
< 0.01), suggesting that the Moral Frame treatment has better efficiency properties
since individuals were the least likely to make contributions that would not be enough
for the group to reach the threshold on average. While the Moral Frame treatment
provides the greatest improvement in eliminating inefficient contributions that will
not allow the group to reach the threshold, the Suggested Contribution treatment
also provides improvement in the share of individuals giving less than the suggestion,
the average of those who Gave Some in the Suggested Contribution treatment is
significantly less than in the Control group (p-value for the t-test is < 0.01). There
is also a significant decrease in the average share of individuals giving nothing in
both Suggested Contribution treatment and Moral Frame treatment (p-values for
both t-test are < 0.01). The Moral Frame treatment’s framing language significantly
increases the share of individuals who contribute toward the group meeting the goal
but does not make individuals less likely to free ride and give nothing, as we can see by
observing that there is no significant difference between the Suggested Contribution
and Moral Frame treatments in the share of individuals in each treatment who gave
zero.
In figure ??D we examine how contributions change as the group size increases.
The contributions to the public good drop off much more rapidly in the Control
group than in either the Suggested Contribution or the Moral Frame treatments.
While contributions in the control group drop from 74.4% of the suggestion for a
group with 6 people to 67.5% of the suggestion for a group with 12 people (p-value
for the t-test is < 0.01) , contributions drop from 87.5% to 84.4% of the suggestion
(p-value for the t-test is 0.08) for the Suggested Contribution treatment and from
90.9% to 87.4% of the suggestion (p-value for the t-test is 0.09) for the Moral frame
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treatment when moving from a group size of 6 to a group size of 12. The Suggested
Contribution and Moral Frame treatments help maintain contributions to the public
good, even as group size increases.
5.3.2 Treatment Effects on Group Outcomes
Not only does the Moral Frame treatment have an impact on individual giving, it
also has an impact on the ability of the group to provide the public good. Figure
??A illustrates the share of times a group successfully reaches the threshold needed to
provide the public good in each of the three treatments. The public good is provided
72% of the time in the Moral Frame treatment and 64% of the time in the Suggested
Contribution treatment (a comparison of mean t-test has p-value 0.01). In the Control
group, the public good is provided by only 29% of the groups which is significantly
lower than when both Suggested Contribution and Moral Frame treatments (both
comparison of mean t-tests have p-values < 0.01). Therefore, while a significant share
of the improvement from a morally framed suggested contribution comes from merely
providing a suggested contribution level, additional improvements in the ability to
provide the public good are possible simple from framing the suggested contribution
with moral language.
Figure ??B illustrates that the ability of the group to provide the public good
as group size increases drops off much more dramatically in the control group than
in either Suggested Contribution treatment or Moral Frame treatments. The Moral
Frame treatment does not statistically significantly improve the ability of the group
to provide the public good above the Suggested Contribution treatment when the
group size is small (the p-value for a t-test comparison of means for 3-person groups
is 0.56). However, with groups of 12, with the Moral Frame treatment the public
good continues to be provided 58% of the time while in the Suggested Contribution
treatment it is provided only 38% of the time (a comparison of means t-test yields a
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p-value=0.04).
While provision of the public good drops from 25% of the suggestion for a group
with 6 people to 8% of the suggestion for a group with 12 people (p-value for the
t-test is 0.01) in the Control treatment, provision of the public good drops from 53%
to 38% of the suggestion (p-value for the t-test is 0.07) for the Suggested Contribution
treatment and from 67% to 58% of the suggestion (p-value for the t-test is 0.28) for the
Moral Frame treatment when moving from a group size of 6 to a group size of 12. The
Suggested Contribution and Moral Frame treatments help maintain provision of the
public good, even as group size increases when compared to the Control Treatment.
Furthermore, many of the improvements in the ability to provide the public good
that are achieved with moral framing occur in larger groups, where the impact of
the suggested contribution appears to weaken more quickly in the absence of morally
framed language.
In figure ??C we consider the sum of earnings in the group in each round as a
percentage of the potential efficiency. We define potential efficiency as the sum of
endowments plus the sum of value received from providing the public good minus the
total amount of contribution needed to reach the threshold for the public good to be
provided. The efficiency of the group’s outcomes is 77% of the potential efficiency
in the Moral Frame treatment; compared to 72% of the potential efficiency in the
Suggested Contribution treatment (a comparison of mean t-test has p-value 0.02).
In the control group, the efficiency is 55% of the potential which is significantly
lower than when both Suggested Contribution and Moral Frame treatments (both
comparison of mean t-tests have p-values < 0.01). Consistent with earlier evidence,
a large share of the success of the strategy of providing a morally framed suggested
contribution comes from introducing the suggested level, but additional gains are
possible when language is framed explicitly in terms of moral responsibility.
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5.3.3 Discussion
We consider the possibility that one determinant of individual charitable action comes
from emotional feelings triggered by a sense of moral responsibility. We consider a
common two-pronged approach by nonprofits that appears to rely on this insight
about emotional responses to a sense of moral responsibility. Charities often combine
a suggested contribution level with language that frames the contribution in the light
of moral responsibility. Our experimental design allows us to separate the simple effect
of providing a suggested contribution level from the additional impact of the framing
language which emphasizes the moral responsibility behind making the suggested
contribution.
We find that providing a suggested contribution both increases the average dona-
tion and increases the share of individuals giving the suggested value, as predicted
by our hypotheses about morally motivated giving. Furthermore, we find additional,
though smaller increases in contribution levels and the share of individuals giving the
suggested values when the suggested contribution is framed in terms of moral respon-
sibility. We conclude that a large part of triggering this emotional response is due to
the simple act of setting a suggested contribution level. Nonetheless, simple moral
framing language can intensify this reaction and bring further increases in donations.
Finally, we see that improvements from the Moral Frame treatment act primarily
to move individuals from the inefficient outcome of donating some but not enough
to meet the group’s threshold to giving the suggested value. Individuals are just as
likely to give nothing in the Moral Frame treatment as the Suggested Contribution
treatment. This suggests that one of the important determinants of moral motiva-
tions is the distance from the moral reference point. Individuals appear to display
some asymmetry in their preferences with respect to giving above the moral reference
point than they do to giving below the moral reference point. Evidence of asymmetry
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with respect to positively and negatively framed contributions would be consistent
with evidence presented by Andreoni (1995) of a distinction between warm glow and
cold prickle.
The success of appeals to moral emotions cannot be well explained by other theo-
ries. Since neither the suggested contribution nor the moral framing in our experiment
have any impact on the choice set, they can only affect the selection among among
multiple equilibria. In this experiment, it is a dominant strategy not to contribute
the suggested value; therefore neither the suggested value nor the moral frame can
be argued to act as merely coordination devices.
Furthermore, our evidence cannot be explained by models of warm glow. Ap-
pealing to a sense of morality is distinct from the notion of an egotistical warm glow
derived from the sense of satisfaction from being generous. The introduction of a
suggested contribution should have no impact on warm glow, since models of warm
glow generally consider warm glow to increase in the actual contribution, regardless
of institutions (such as a suggested contribution or language morally framing the
problem). Nonetheless, if giving is motivated by emotional responses to a sense of
moral responsibility, this does not imply that all giving can be explained by moral
motives. In fact, giving may be motivated by both warm glow and a sense of moral
responsibility.
Lastly, our results cannot be explained by existing theories on the social signaling
motives for giving or models of social preferences. The moral framing was independent
of any variation in the worthiness of recipients, opportunities for social signaling
or sense of fairness as suggested by recent theories of more subtle motivation for
charitable giving.4
One open question for research is how important these kind of moral motives
are in predicting contributions when compared to neoclassical motives, altruism and
4Fong and Luttmer (2009), Benabou and Tirole (2006), Fehr and Ga¨chter (2002)
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warm-glow considerations. Understanding the importance of moral motivations for
giving will depend on a better understanding of where a moral reference point comes
from and whether individuals start with some moral reference point for contributing
to charities, even in the absence of a suggested contribution level.
Gaining insight into how these moral motives are activated is also a crucial com-
ponent of understanding the role they play in explaining charitable giving. As in
the example provided in the introduction, where individuals are contacted with a
morally framed request by two different and similar organizations, it could be that
a moral frame is successful only in partial equilibrium but if it were to be adopted
by all organizations it would no longer be successful. In the presence of multiple
appeals to moral responsibility, their effect could be diminished. Similarly, it could
be that individuals differ in their prior tendency to be morally motivated based on
their beliefs. Moral framing might be expected to be successful only if individuals
have a sense that a charitable cause is morally worthy and might not be moved by a
cause they do not believe in.
Another possible area of research is whether moral motives are determine by some
kind of social norm. For instance, it could be that individuals derive guilt or pride
from their adherence to a moral reference point. If so, it could be that this kind of
motivation could lead to interesting multiple equilibria. As suggested by Bernheim
and Rangel’s (2007, 2009) model of behavioral welfare economics, it is not clear
whether this kind of moral framing represents a a welfare maximizing treatment,
since individuals might feel manipulated ex post and the emotion response to moral
framing may correspond to the manipulation of emotions instead of an improvement
in well-being.
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